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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of a disaster, relief agencies rush to assist the affected population. 
However, lack of coordination between these agencies often results in poor resource 
management, which undermines efficacy and efficiency. This report facilitates inter-
agency collaboration, particularly between military and non-military entities, by 
conducting a case study of one non-government organization involved in disaster relief. 
With the second-highest revenue among major non-government organizations in the 
United States, the Salvation Army in America—and, by extension, its international arm, 
the Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO)—is an ideal candidate for 
evaluation. This report evaluates SAWSO’s disaster response capabilities by analyzing its 
organizational history, operational competencies, and financial resources. The results of 
this report offer a foundation for military and other humanitarian relief agencies to pursue 
collaborative efforts and increase the overall efficiency and efficacy of future disaster 
response operations. This report’s findings indicate that SAWSO is a highly efficient 
organization from a financial standpoint, and that it offers a variety of relief capabilities 
that vary by region, with the provision of shelter, settlement, and non-food items among 
its strongest and most consistent competencies. 
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Natural and man-made disasters exact a high cost in terms of human life and 
economic damage. Preliminary data in a report from the Center for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disease (CRED) indicates that during 2016, 102 counties experienced 
disasters, with a combined impact of 7,628 deaths, 411 million affected persons, and $97 
billion of damage (CRED, 2016). Disasters, both natural and manmade, occur worldwide 
and often disproportionately affect poor and developing countries. Between 1990 and 
1998, 94% of disasters occurred in developing countries; these countries also accounted 
for two-thirds of disaster-related economic damages (Thomas & Kopczak, 2007).  
When disasters occur, particularly in developing countries, the international 
community responds with a variety of organizations arriving on-site to conduct relief 
operations. These entities include government, military, and non-government 
organizations (NGOs), each with unique sets of capabilities and resources. Without a 
central coordinating element, the efforts of these entities lack cohesion and may suffer 
from inefficient or redundant use of resources, diluting the effectiveness of their response 
efforts to aid affected populations. Particularly since the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, 
“the overall budget for humanitarian efforts have increased—and this in turn has brought 
increased attention to humanitarian logistics” (Apte, 2010, p. 3). In fact, logistics 
expenditures make up 80% of the total overall disaster relief expenditures by aid agencies 
(Cozzalino, 2012). Effective and efficient coordination requires communication between 
all involved parties, preferably prior to the onset of a disaster. 
Following the 2004 Asian tsunami, disaster relief operations, particularly 
humanitarian logistics, received increased attention and was established as a distinct field 
of study. Thomas and Kopczak (2007) contributed to the academic foundation of this 
topic by defining humanitarian logistics and identifying both internal and external 
challenges to executing effective relief operations. Apte (2010) expanded on this field of 
research by providing a classification system for disasters and the corresponding 
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difficulty of response operations. In their 2012 work, Apte and Yoho further contributed 
to framing the dialogue for humanitarian logistics by identifying essential services and 
resources for disaster relief, along with corresponding core capabilities possessed by 
military and non-military organizations. This led to increasingly focused research on the 
disaster relief resources of specific organizations, including the United States Navy and 
Military Sealift Command (Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, & Ingram, 2013), and the United 
States Marine Corps (Apte & Yoho, 2014; Gastrock & Iturriaga, 2013).   
Roberts (2010) and Cozzalino (2012) added to the research on the relationships 
between disaster relief entities by examining the challenges inherent to civil–military 
coordination. Both authors emphasized that reducing the friction between NGOs and the 
military requires the organizations to integrate their efforts prior to, during, and after 
disaster relief operations. Daniels (2012), Nguyen and Curley (2013), and Harper, 
Koelkebeck, and Fitz-Gerald (2013) sought to mitigate this friction and facilitate 
collaboration by compiling a capabilities-based summary of NGOs conducting disaster 
relief operations in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command 
(PACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs).  
B. MOTIVATION 
As the military shifted its focus to address the full spectrum of conflict in the 
post–Cold War era, friction increased between the U.S. military and NGOs who 
increasingly found themselves working together for humanitarian relief (Roberts, 2010). 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that between 
1979 and 2000, U.S. forces diverted from their original mission 366 times for 
humanitarian assistance, but only 22 times for combat (Apte et al., 2013). With an 
increasing focus on building and maintaining relationships that will improve the security 
environment, it is likely that the military’s involvement in disaster relief operations will 
remain a constant factor for the foreseeable future. However, the military is often a costly 
option for disaster relief, adding weight to the already-compelling case for reducing 
inefficiencies and redundancies in disaster relief operations. If the military possessed 
greater awareness of the capabilities and resources various NGOs bring to relief efforts in 
 3 
each COCOM, this knowledge could be leveraged to facilitate a more effective and 
efficient overall response. 
Previous literature contains summary-level data for NGOs involved in disaster 
relief activities in PACOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM. Compiling this information 
offers a useful tool for military commanders and other involved personnel to more 
intelligently manage their resources, but it does not address how an NGO’s capabilities 
may differ by region. Furthermore, commanders currently lack a detailed and focused 
analysis of the larger NGOs that have the likelihood and capability to respond to disaster 
events. An analysis focused on the primary players in disaster relief would provide 
commanders with a valuable resource for evaluating their areas of responsibility and 
coordinating efforts within that region.  
With the second-highest total annual revenue among major NGOs in the United 
States, the Salvation Army is an ideal candidate for evaluation as a primary player in 
disaster relief operations (Apte & Hudgens, 2015). The Salvation Army is an 
international organization with headquarters in London, England, and a presence in 127 
countries as of 2015 (Maxwell, 2015). Two-thirds of overseas support for Salvation 
Army operations is provided by the U.S. territories through a mix of contributions, 
donations-in-kind, sales to the public, and other revenue sources. The Salvation Army 
World Service Office (SAWSO) acts as the international arm of the American Salvation 
Army by “serv[ing] as a conduit for government and internal funds sponsoring aid and 
self-help projects in developing countries” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 196). Relief and 
reconstruction services are one of the three program services into which SAWSO 
channels its efforts and resources. Given its international presence, high level of revenue, 
and involvement in disaster relief activities, SAWSO is an important player whose 
disaster relief capabilities should be evaluated to provide commanders and humanitarian 
logistics professionals with an analysis that facilitates inter-agency coordination and 
resource management. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Coordination difficulties prevent the military and NGOs from effectively and 
efficiently managing resources during disaster relief operations. While differences in 
organizational culture contribute to this friction, the lack of awareness of each 
organization’s unique capabilities also plays a role. This research seeks to mitigate the 
barriers to collaboration and facilitate effective resource management by answering the 
following research question: based on its organizational history and financial and 
operational resources, what disaster relief capabilities can SAWSO employ in each U.S. 
Combatant Command? 
D. RESEARCH METHODS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This report analyzes the organizational history of SAWSO, its operational 
competencies, and its financial resources to offer readers a well-rounded evaluation of its 
disaster relief capabilities. The organizational history analysis examines the Salvation 
Army’s origins in England and its development in the United States to identify 
characteristics and values that continue to impact the organization today.  
The operational capabilities analysis relies on qualitative data drawn from news 
sources describing SAWSO’s reaction to various disaster events. This report analyzes the 
data using the Sphere Project’s minimum standards for humanitarian aid and assigns a 
corresponding score that indicates SAWSO’s capabilities within each category. This 
analysis is divided by COCOM to provide greater relevancy and nuance for commanders 
and interested parties.  
A qualitative comparison of SAWSO and the core competencies for disaster relief 
of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) provides additional context to assess SAWSO’s 
capabilities. This comparison uses Apte and Yoho’s 2012 identification of essential 
services and capabilities for disaster response and qualitative data gathered from news 
articles to make a comparison between the organizations for each COCOM. 
The financial analysis uses the methodology set forth by Nguyen and Curley 
(2013) to categorize annual revenue sources and expenses with data drawn from the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990s and Office of Management and Budget 
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(OMB) Circular A-133 Financial Reports covering 2003 to 2015. To provide a region-
specific evaluation of SAWSO’s disaster relief spending, this report evaluates data from 
the financial reports to illustrate how SAWSO distributes funds by both geographic 
region, as defined by the IRS, and by geographic combatant command, as defined by the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). 
1. Summary of Findings 
This report’s findings provide useful information for government and non-
government agencies seeking to coordinate disaster relief efforts with SAWSO. The 
Salvation Army’s history highlights a focus on evangelical Christianity as its overarching 
purpose. While the evangelical elements have received less emphasis over time for the 
Salvation Army in America, this religious aspect continues to provide its core foundation 
and influences its values and international works. Additionally, the Salvation Army 
remains a highly centralized organization, with a hierarchical structure that may be 
familiar to military personnel. An understanding of these characteristics may assist the 
military and other agencies in their coordination efforts and identify potential areas of 
conflict between organizational cultures. 
SAWSO’s operational capabilities for disaster relief vary by region. In general, 
SAWSO demonstrates its strongest capabilities in shelter, settlement, and non-food items, 
meeting between 0.50 and 0.80 of Sphere minimum standards. AFRICOM is an outlier in 
this category, as SAWSO demonstrates the ability to meet just 0.20 of the minimum 
standards in that region. Additionally, while SAWSO provides support in the general area 
of food security in each COCOM, its highest overall score in food security and nutrition 
is 0.31 in AFRICOM. With the exception of SOUTHCOM, where it meets 0.42 of 
minimum standards, SAWSO also scores low in health action overall. These findings 
offer humanitarian logistics planners the information needed to more efficiently shape 
resource management efforts and facilitate inter-agency collaboration when responding to 
disaster events. 
Additionally, an analysis of SAWSO’s financial status reveals that it demonstrates 
high overall budget and mission efficiency, with a majority of its program funding going 
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to disaster relief operations. This indicates a strong fiscal foundation supporting 
SAWSO’s operational capabilities; however, this foundation relies heavily on public 
contributions, which may fluctuate depending on shifts in public opinion and economic 
conditions. According to SAWSO’s IRS Form 990s, contributions between 2003 and 
2015 ranged from a low of $9,366,623 in 2003 to a high of $49,102,347 in 2010. In 
general, SAWSO’s regional spending tends to match the locations of global disaster 
events, with significant expenditures in the EUCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM AORs. 
SAWSO includes refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) aid under its relief and 
reconstruction program service, which may result in a decrease in financial resources for 
other, rapid-onset disasters if a high-volume refugee crisis occurs at the same time. 
2. Limitations 
A limitation of this report involves the data gathered to analyze SAWSO’s 
operational capabilities. Most sources used to gather this data are news articles published 
by the Salvation Army, as third party sources failed to provide the necessary level of 
detail to make an evaluation. Therefore, this data may contain a level of bias toward 
SAWSO’s accomplishments. Whenever possible, this limitation was mitigated by using 
multiple articles for each disaster event, and it is unlikely that the bias extends to the level 
of completely fabricating core competencies. A second limitation is that both the scoring 
evaluation for how SAWSO’s capabilities measure up to the Sphere Project’s minimum 
standards and the MEU comparison are based on the author’s judgment. This involves a 
level of subjectivity, and other people may reach different conclusions based on the same 
data. However, the underlying reasoning is sound and provides a useful template for 
further refinement and research.  
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This case study divides its analysis of SAWSO into nine chapters.. Chapter II 
presents a review of related literature and highlights significant works in the field of 
humanitarian logistics. Chapter III describes the methodology used to gather and analyze 
the data in this case study. Chapter IV presents a description and analysis of the Salvation 
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Army’s organizational history to identify how its roots and core characteristics influence 
the organization’s relationships and operations in the present. Chapter V presents 
qualitative data collected from various news sources to evaluate SAWSO’s disaster relief 
operational capabilities, and Chapter VI uses that data in conjunction with the Sphere 
Project’s minimum standards to present a capability analysis for each COCOM. Chapter 
VII compares the disaster relief core competencies of SAWSO and a MEU by using the 
methodology developed by Apte and Yoho (2012), and the results of studies by Gastrock 
and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014) on the MEU’s disaster relief capabilities. 
Chapter VIII offers a financial analysis of SAWSO, including overall budget efficiency 
and expenditures on disaster relief by region. Finally, Chapter IX concludes the case 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This report focuses on the SAWSO’s capabilities regarding disaster relief 
operations. Given this specific scope, the literature review examines previous works in a 
broad-to-narrow sequence. The first section summarizes literature that provides a general 
overview of humanitarian logistics. The next section discusses works that address the 
unique characteristics and challenges of civilian–military coordination during disaster 
relief activities. This leads to a narrower field of literature, which analyzes non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) by geographic combatant command. Finally, the 
literature review concludes with a review of works concerning the United States Marine 
Corps’ disaster relief capabilities. 
A. OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS 
According to Thomas and Kopczak (2007), humanitarian logistics cemented its 
place as a distinctive field of study following the 2004 Asian tsunami relief operations. 
The authors define humanitarian logistics as “the function that is charged with ensuring 
the efficient and cost effective flow and storage of goods and materials for the purpose of 
alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people” (p. 94). The human suffering associated 
with natural disasters, combined with increasing economic costs, create a situation where 
effective logistical operations are imperative. The Munich Reinsurance group reported 
that on average, real annual economic losses from natural disasters grew consistently 
between the 1960s and 1990s (Thomas & Kopczak, 2007).   
Along with these observations, Thomas and Kopczak (2007) also identify several 
challenges involved in humanitarian logistics. These include external challenges, such as 
increasing donor scrutiny and limited transportation capacity due to damaged physical 
infrastructure. However, Thomas and Kopczak classify the humanitarian community’s 
internal challenges as more of a threat to effective logistic operations. Internal challenges 
include failing to recognize the importance of logistics, inability to maintain an 
experienced staff, “ineffective leveraging of technology,” “lack of institutional learning,” 
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and insufficient collaboration (p. 98). For instance, aid agencies tend to divide their 
activities into primary programs and support activities. As Thomas and Kopczak point 
out, it is easy for many agencies to make the mistake of devoting a majority of their focus 
to the primary programs, while considering funding and coordination of support activities 
generally as more of an after-thought. By identifying these challenges and suggesting 
strategies to overcome them, Thomas and Kopczak help establish humanitarian logistics 
as a unique field of study. 
Apte’s (2010) monograph expands even further on humanitarian logistics as a 
new field of research. She offers a more detailed definition of humanitarian logistics than 
Thomas and Kopczak, asserting that it encompasses “that special branch of logistics 
which manages [the] response supply chain of critical supplies and services with 
challenges such as demand surges, uncertain supplies, critical time windows in face of 
infrastructure vulnerabilities and vast scope and size of the operations” (p. 1). Apte points 
out that the presence of resources such as food, water, and medical supplies means little if 
these resources cannot be transported in the last mile of distribution, and emphasizes the 
importance of collaboration between all involved agencies.   
She also provides a useful classification of disasters by speed of onset and 
location with corresponding difficulty of conducting disaster relief operations. Figure 1 
provides a visual of the classifications Apte proposes. Dispersed and sudden-onset 
disasters present the highest difficulty in coordinating a response, while localized, slow-
onset events present the lowest difficulty.   
One area Apte (2010) does not explore in her monograph is how organizational 
and regional funding affects the distribution of disaster-relief resources in comparison to 
her classification scheme. Rapid onset, dispersed disasters may require more funding 
based on the difficulty of conducting an effective response. However, since funding is 
often committed to disaster relief efforts ex ante, existing funding streams may lack the 
flexibility to efficiently re-orient to rapid onset disasters. 
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Figure 1.  Classification of Disasters. Source: Apte (2010). 
Another crucial take-away from Apte’s (2010) monograph is her compilation of 
organizational issues in humanitarian logistics, gathered from an examination of previous 
sources including Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009). This list includes collaboration 
between humanitarian entities, training response staff, donor influence, and information 
and risk management (Apte, 2010). According to Apte, these issues require careful 
consideration and planning to maximize the effectiveness of disaster response operations.  
Apte and Yoho (2012) refine this list of issues into a description of the crucial 
services and capabilities for disaster response operations. These essential capabilities are 
displayed for ease of reference in Figure 2. Gathering information and situational 
awareness must occur before needs can be accurately assessed for the affected population 
and area. Needs assessment allows the supply chain to decouple, shifting from forecast-
based to specific customer demands (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Supply, the third essential 
capability, “includes procurement, staging, warehousing, and inventory management” 
(Apte & Yoho, 2012, p. 11). The military is often uniquely suited to the fourth capability: 
deployment and distribution. Its vertical lift capacity and rapidly deployable ground 
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transportation assets provide a significant advantage in distribution operations, 
particularly in the last mile to customers (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Military and non-military 
organizations seek to prevent loss of life and alleviate pain through health service 
support. Finally, the capability for collaboration and governance recognizes the need to 
coordinate between all involved entities, and the requirement for a command and control 
structure (Apte & Yoho, 2012).   
  
Figure 2.  Essential Services and Capabilities for Disaster Response. 
Source: Apte & Yoho (2012). 
Having defined the essential capabilities for disaster response, Apte and Yoho 
(2012) conclude their work by addressing the military and non-military core capabilities 
that correspond to each of the six services. Figure 3 illustrates the link between these core 
organizational capabilities and essential response services. By classifying and 
categorizing the capabilities for each general type of entity as they relate to primary 
disaster relief capabilities, Apte and Yoho (2012) assist in framing the dialogue to discuss 
humanitarian logistics and key players’ capabilities in that arena. They contribute to 
constructing the general vocabulary and classification schemes necessary to discuss 
disaster relief operations on an academic level, but a more detailed discussion of 
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organization and region-specific capabilities is needed in order to place the information in 
an operational context for military and civilian leaders. 
 
 
This figure was adapted by Apte and Yoho from Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics (Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). 
Figure 3.  Humanitarian and Military Core Competencies. 
Source: Apte & Yoho (2012). 
Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, and Ingram (2013) begin to narrow the scope of research 
with regard to the humanitarian logistic capabilities of an individual organization, as 
opposed to a generalized set of entities. In particular, the authors evaluate the capabilities 
of various ships in the United States Navy (USN) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
against common disaster traits. These traits include large numbers of casualties, 
population dispersion, demand for basic-level supplies such as food and water, a need for 
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medical staff, the destruction of infrastructure, and high volume of debris and destroyed 
structures (Apte et al., 2013). Their research introduces a more specific way of examining 
asset capability by linking disaster traits to relief requirements and evaluating associated 
disaster response mission sets against ship platform capabilities (Apte et al., 2013).   
Apte et al. (2013) use a different analysis framework than Apte and Yoho’s 
(2012) list of essential disaster capabilities, but both works emphasize the importance of 
studying agency capabilities as they relate to disaster response operations. Apte et al. 
(2013) demonstrate this shared focus by asserting that “identification of the specific 
competencies and capabilities that are core to the types of organizations will clarify who, 
what, and when relief is brought to the crisis” (p. 43). The greater understanding agencies 
have of one another’s capabilities and limitations, the more effectively they can conduct 
relief operations together, ultimately resulting in a positive impact on the affected 
population’s welfare and overall economic costs (Apte et al., 2013). A natural extension 
of Apte et al.’s (2013) work is an analysis of other military services and major NGOs. 
B. CIVIL–MILITARY COORDINATION 
The previous section summarized a general overview of the classification systems 
and essential capabilities associated with humanitarian logistics. In keeping with a 
progression from broad to narrower topic areas, this section considers literature on the 
characteristics and challenges of civilian–military coordination during relief efforts. 
Roberts (2010) argues that the changing nature of warfare following the Cold War 
and the military’s increasing involvement in operations other than war are the leading 
causes of turmoil between civilian and military entities. As the boundaries of traditional 
warfare blur, the military and civilian relief organizations increasingly find themselves 
forced to work side by side in environments spanning the spectrum from non-kinetic 
(peace time) to kinetic (open warfare). However, cultural and organizational differences 
create friction between the two types of players (Roberts, 2010).   
For instance, an NGO’s reputation for neutrality often plays a significant role in 
how effectively and safely it can deliver services to the affected population. By contrast, 
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military forces are viewed as decidedly non-neutral and may be treated with suspicion 
and hostility. The organizational tendency to protect the appearance of neutrality often 
discourages NGOs from openly collaborating with military entities (Roberts, 2010). From 
the military’s point of view, NGOs appear inefficient and poorly organized without the 
clear-cut hierarchical command and control structure favored by military forces (Roberts, 
2010). Additionally, NGOs resent the military’s view of them as force multipliers, and 
the military resents the commonly held NGO belief that the military politicizes 
humanitarianism (Roberts, 2010). While Roberts does not deliberately explore the impact 
of this friction, it is likely that such attitudes and divisions lead to inefficiencies in the 
delivery of life-saving services in the aftermath of a disaster. Speaking a similar 
professional language and understanding other entities’ organizational cultures 
contributes to reducing inter-agency friction and improving overall response.  
The ease of coordination between military and civilian organizations also varies 
based on external factors. Roberts (2010) illustrates four distinct categories of civilian–
military operations defined by the combination of environmental threats and domain 
consensus. Each of these four quadrants, displayed in Figure 4, offers a unique set of 
challenges with regard to civilian–military operations. For the purposes of this report, 
Quadrant II, disaster relief, is the most salient.   
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Figure 4.  Civilian and Military Operations under Varying Conditions of 
Threat and Domain Consensus. Source: Roberts (2010). 
While executing relief efforts, both military and civilian organizations have a high 
domain consensus and agreement on mission requirements to rapidly provide life-saving 
provisions and care to affected populations (Roberts, 2010). Roberts (2010) argues that 
the friction between military and civilian entities is lower during disaster relief 
operations, due to an acknowledgment of “their mutual dependencies and the 
complementarity of their efforts” (p. 215). However, she acknowledges that deteriorating 
relations have a positive correlation to the environmental threat level; as the level of 
warfare increases, civilian–military coordination becomes increasingly strained (Roberts, 
2010).  
Both Roberts (2010) and Cozzalino (2012) emphasize that reducing the friction 
that often accompanies civilian–military collaboration requires integration between the 
involved entities prior to, during, and after disaster relief operations. Roberts (2010) 
encourages the spread of self-emergent communities of practice to determine the best 
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standard operating procedures for both sides to observe in their interactions with one 
another. Cozzalino (2012) echoes this call for collaboration, but states that “optimizing 
the logistic performance requires that all the relationships among the actors involved are 
managed through an integrated approach to efficiency and effectively coordinate inter-
organizational performance, eliminate redundancy, and maximize efficiency along the 
entire emergency supply chain” (p. 6).   
In particular, eliminating redundancy is crucial, given that logistic expenditures 
account for 80% of total overall aid agency disaster relief expenses (Cozzalino, 2012). 
The United Nations’ Humanitarian Response Review, established in 2005, demonstrates 
wider recognition of the importance of effective collaboration by the international aid 
society (Cozzalino, 2012). Overall, these sources establish the challenges of conducting 
effective coordination between military and civilian organizations. They offer general 
solutions to the issue, but the wide scope of these recommendations makes them difficult 
to implement in practice, at least on a large scale. 
C. ANALYZING NGOS BY GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND 
In response to both an awareness of challenges in coordination between military 
and civilian organizations, and the military’s increasing focus on the conduct of disaster 
relief operations, I further narrowed the focus of this review to consider NGO presence 
and capabilities by geographic combatant command. Geographic combatant commands 
divide the world into six regions: Africa Command (AFRICOM), Central Command 
(CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 
Pacific Command (PACOM), and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).   
Daniels (2012), Nguyen and Curley (2013), and Harper et al. (2013) each 
examined major disaster relief operating in the EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM 
areas of responsibility (AORs), respectively. Daniels (2012) selected 25 NGOs in the 
EUCOM AOR based primarily on their financial revenues, since revenue is a prerequisite 
enabling mechanism for the delivery of goods and services. The secondary consideration 
in selection was the amount of work each NGO conducted in Europe, with an emphasis 
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on organizations active throughout the region, rather than localized in one country or area 
(Daniels, 2012).   
Daniels (2012) analyzed these NGOs based on five indicators of how the 
organization operated and where it focused its work. These indicators include 
“mission/primary focus, capability, religious affiliation, training, and if [the NGOs] 
liaison with militaries” (Daniels, 2012, p. 6). After analyzing each of these indicators for 
the 25 NGOs, Daniels (2012) linked each of these factors to six mission sets, and created 
NGO clusters by mission set. These mission sets include disaster relief, food provision, 
water sanitation, medical aid, specific focus on women and children, and developing 
local economies (Daniels, 2012). Daniels (2012) provided a useful basis for comparison 
by cross-referencing NGOs’ five operational indicators against mission sets. He found 
that of the 25 NGOs examined, 24 included disaster relief and preparedness in their 
mission set, 16 included food security and nutrition, and 15 included medical care and/or 
supplies (Daniels, 2012). However, his work did not consider the impact of revenues and 
expenses with regard to organizational efficiency. 
Nguyen and Curley (2013) addressed this shortcoming when they used Daniels’s 
five organizational indicators to analyze 27 NGOs in the PACOM AOR, and added a 
sixth indicator devoted to budget consideration. Budget considerations were based 
primarily on the IRS Form 990, self-reported financial statements from individual NGOs, 
or annual reports published by the NGOs. The budget analysis examined each NGO’s 
sources of revenue, expenses, and compared the use of revenue versus expenses to 
evaluate the NGO’s efficacy (Nguyen & Curley, 2013). Of note, Nguyen and Curley 
(2013) improved on Daniels’s (2012) methodology by conducting a general investigation 
into NGO mission efficiency based on a comparison of mission and support expenses. 
Similar to Daniels’s (2012) approach, Nguyen and Curley (2013) concluded their 
research by summarizing NGO capabilities under four core competencies (health care, 
capacity building, education/training, and disaster response). This sheds light on the 
capabilities presented by NGOs in the PACOM AOR. 
Harper et al. (2013) examined NGOs in the SOUTHCOM AOR in a similar 
fashion to Nguyen and Curley (2013) and Daniels (2012), but with the important addition 
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of Sphere Project criteria to judge NGO capabilities against established minimum 
humanitarian standards. The Sphere Project publishes a handbook that “is one of the most 
widely known and internationally recognized set of common principles and universal 
minimum standards in life-saving areas of humanitarian response” (The Sphere Project, 
2011, p. 5). Using Sphere Project criteria, Harper et al. (2013) developed a decision-
making tool and color-coded commander’s reference card, which afforded commanders 
the ability to determine each NGO’s disaster response capabilities at a glance. Harper et 
al. (2013) also worked directly with the SOUTHCOM Partnering Directorate (known by 
its designator J9), a connection which directed their choice of NGOs for the analysis and 
lent real-world credibility to their report. With the development of these tools, Harper et 
al.’s (2013) work represented a significant step forward in facilitating the usability of 
their research, and established a link between their research and real-world operations. 
Earnest, Smith, and Stark (2014) linked Harper et al. (2013), Daniels (2012), and 
Nguyen and Curley (2013) together by applying the unique parts of each individual work 
to the 88 NGOs considered in EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM AORs. This 
involved applying both Harper et al.’s (2013) Sphere Project criteria and commander 
decision-making tools and Nguyen and Curley’s (2013) financial analysis methodology 
to the NGOs mentioned in each of the AOR-specific reports. After compiling the 
financial and Sphere criteria information, Earnest, Smith, and Stark (2014) concluded 
their report by suggesting that individual NGOs be interviewed directly to ascertain a 
more nuanced and accurate evaluation of their disaster relief capabilities.   
D. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS DISASTER RELIEF CAPABILITIES 
While the previous section reviews literature evaluating the disaster relief 
capabilities of NGOs within various geographic combatant commands, this section 
summarizes key sources that evaluate the disaster relief capabilities of the United States 
Marine Corps (USMC). Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) use the essential capabilities of 
disaster response compiled by Apte and Yoho (2012) as a framework to evaluate the 
USMC’s response to three recent disasters. These natural disasters include the 2007 
Bangladesh cyclone, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and the 2011 Japanese earthquake and 
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tsunami (Gastrock & Iturriaga, 2013). Given the USMC response to these disasters, 
Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) also consider the hard and soft assets of the Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to evaluate both how capabilities were applied and which 
assets may have filled gaps exposed during the afore-mentioned operations.   
Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) found that the MEU’s response typically consisted 
of providing water distribution and storage, medical care, material handling equipment 
(MHE), and supply distribution. In particular, they noted that the Marine Corps’ air lift 
distribution, MHE, and ground transportation capabilities were unique to the Marine 
Corps and typically in high demand (Gastrock & Iturriaga, 2013). This corresponds to the 
MEU’s baseline table of equipment, listed in Table 1. The baseline table of equipment 
lists the equipment with which an MEU typically deploys. Gastrock and Iturriaga’s 
(2013) work provides a useful document for civilian and military planners alike to use as 
a quick reference when assigning disaster relief responsibilities and coordinating multi-
agency relief efforts. Their research highlights the fact that the Marine Corps possesses 
unique equipment and associated advantages tied to its military role that may allow it to 
respond more effectively in some areas than NGOs. 
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Table 1.   Sample MEU Baseline Equipment. Source: Gastrock (2013). 
 
 
Apte and Yoho (2014) also consider the Marine Corps’ disaster relief capabilities 
using the essential capabilities framework established by Apte and Yoho (2012). Their 
work examines the same three disasters as Earnest and Iturriaga (2013). Apte and Yoho’s 
2014 research process model is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Research Process Model for Data Collection and Analysis. 
Source: Apte & Yoho (2014).  
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Apte and Yoho (2014) agree with Earnest and Iturriaga (2013) that the MEU 
“excels at deployment and distribution through the use of amphibious and especially 
rotary wing assets . . . to lift and distribute assets within an austere environment where 
other organizations cannot” (Apte & Yoho, 2014, p. 20). The two sources also agree that 
the MEU possesses assets capable of filling gaps along the essential disaster response 
capabilities identified during the three disasters under scrutiny (Earnest & Iturriaga, 2013; 
Apte & Yoho, 2014). These sources demonstrate the capabilities the USMC MEU 
possess with regard to disaster relief operations, and demonstrate their use and efficacy 
during three real-world events. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSIONS 
This literature review reveals that previous works established a sound baseline for 
analyzing humanitarian logistics and civilian–military coordination while conducting 
relief activities.   The vocabulary and framework to have meaningful discussions for this 
area of study is in place due to the works described in the Overview of Humanitarian 
Logistics and Civil-Military Coordination sections. The literature examined in Analyzing 
NGOs by Combatant Command narrows the research another step by providing a broad 
overview of various NGOs and their disaster relief capabilities by Combatant Command. 
This work magnifies this area of study one step further by focusing exclusively on 
the Salvation Army World Service Office. Whereas previous studies provided general 
overviews, my research examines Salvation Army International’s capabilities by region, 
including an analysis of their financial, physical, and intangible resources. Just as Earnest 
and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014) combined concept with reality to provide 
an operationally-useful analysis of the USMC’s disaster relief capabilities, this research 
will provide an authoritative reference for SAWSO’s capabilities and limitations for 
disaster relief. This work also examines these capabilities in comparison to the MEU’s, 
providing MEU commanders a viable tool to rapidly evaluate where they may fill gaps or 
increase response capacity.    
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III. RESEARCH METHODS 
This report utilizes an embedded design, single-case study method to analyze the 
SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities. Yin (2009) defines a case study as “an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (p. 13). Yin (2009) also notes that case studies are generally appropriate when 
the researcher asks questions such as “how” or “why,” when the researcher has no power 
over occurrences, and when dealing with a modern event rooted in reality.   
A. ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY 
First, the case study examines SAWSO’s history to identify the underlying 
organizational culture, trends, and patterns. This involves delving into various literature 
sources concerning the origins of the Salvation Army in England and its presence in the 
United States. This section begins with an overview of the Salvation Army’s sense of 
identity and core beliefs. It examines the Salvation Army’s origins in England, focusing 
on how the personality of its founder, William Booth, and the organization’s early 
experiences shaped the its trajectory. Following this trajectory, this section delves into the 
Salvation Army’s unique history in the United States. It concludes with an examination 
of the Salvation Army’s modern structure and a description of SAWSO’s origins as the 
international arm of the Salvation Army in the United States.  
B. CAPABILITY ANALYSIS 
To collect data for a SAWSO’s capability analysis, this report compiles 
qualitative data from financial documents and news articles. Attempts to solicit 
information on disaster relief capabilities directly from SAWSO were unsuccessful. 
Additionally, SAWSO integrates closely with the Salvation Army’s local organizational 
infrastructure during the execution of its program services. This coordination with local 
Salvation Army units makes it difficult to separate qualitative capability data between 
entities. To mitigate the chance of including data from relief activities that do not involve 
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SAWSO, this report focuses data collection efforts on disaster relief operations identified 
in SAWSO’s 2003–2015 OMB Circular A-133 Financial Reports as Temporarily 
Restricted Net Assets.  
This report uses a modified version of the methodology developed by Harper et 
al. (2013) to assess SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities using the Sphere Handbook. It 
applies the Sphere Project’s performance measures to evaluate the SAWSO’s capabilities 
against “widely known and internationally recognized sets of common principals and 
universal minimum standards” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 5). This evaluation expands 
on previous research by examining SAWSO’s capabilities from regional standpoints 
rather than as a monolith organization. Such region-specific information is more useful to 
military commanders and other humanitarian logistics personnel than generalized data 
that may or may not apply to each region. 
The Sphere Project considers four core competencies essential to the conduct of 
effective humanitarian operations. These competencies include water supply, sanitation, 
and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement, and non-food 
items; and health action (The Sphere Project, 2011). The Sphere Handbook (2011) sub-
divides each core competency into identifiable standards with related key actions and 
indicators for evaluation. This report uses these standards as grading criteria to evaluate 
SAWSO’s disaster response capabilities. Within each category and region, SAWSO 
receives a score based on the proportion of standards it meets, as indicated by the 
qualitative data. For example, if SAWSO meets four out of seven minimum standards, it 
receives a score of 0.57.  
C. MEU COMPARISON  
Following an evaluation of SAWSO’s operational capabilities for disaster relief, 
this report compares those capabilities with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The 
purpose of this evaluation is to identify redundancies, gaps in disaster relief coverage, 
and potential areas to increase relief capacity through inter-organizational collaboration. 
This report utilizes the analyses conducted by Gastrock (2013) and Apte and Yoho 
(2014) to establish a baseline of MEU disaster response-related capabilities and 
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resources. Apte and Yoho (2012) list core military and non-military competencies and 
show how they link to the essential services and capabilities for disaster response. This 
section uses that classification system to categorize and compare SAWSO’s capabilities 
versus a MEU’s. This involves linking each identified capability to information and 
knowledge management, needs assessment, supply deployment and distribution, health 
service support, or collaboration and governance (Apte & Yoho, 2012). The information 
is further divided into geographic combatant command areas of responsibility. 
Comparing SAWSO’s capabilities to an MEU’s provides additional context that is useful 
for regional commanders and logistics planners to identify potential redundancies, 
capacity expansion, and logistics gaps that may be filled by SAWSO’s competencies. 
D. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS  
This report conducts a financial analysis of SAWSO using the methodology set 
forth by Nguyen and Curley (2013). This section begins with a brief overview of 
literature concerning the Salvation Army’s early practices for financial accountability. It 
compiles and analyzes data from the IRS Form 990s and OMB Circular A-133 Financial 
Reports covering the period from 2003 to 2015.  
In accordance with the methodology developed by Nguyen and Curley (2013), 
revenues are divided into the four categories of grants, contributions, investments, and 
other. Grant revenues are from government sources, whereas contributions include cash 
and dollar value of in-kind services and goods. Investment revenues largely consist of 
interest, and other revenues are those that fall outside the previous three categories 
(Nguyen & Curley, 2013). Expenses are divided into program service expenses, which 
are directed toward executing SAWSO’s primary mission, and supporting services, which 
include all expenditures necessary to run a business, but are not unique to SAWSO’s 
mission. 
Using the newly categorized financial data, the report examines SAWSO’s 
mission efficiency at both the general and regional level. Mission efficiency is 
determined using the criteria established by CharityWatch, which states that at least 60% 
of expenditures should be directed toward program services to receive a “satisfactory” 
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evaluation (CharityWatch, 2016). If 75% or more of expenditures focus on program 
services, the organization is deemed highly efficient (CharityWatch, 2016). This section 
also compares relief and reconstruction expenditures by region, and speculates on how 
disaster events may have influenced SAWSO’s spending between 2008 and 2015. 
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY 
A. THE SALVATION ARMY’S BELIEFS 
For many Americans, the Salvation Army calls to mind images of red kettle 
collections and bell ringing at Christmas or thrift stores catering to the poorer segments of 
society. Few associate the Salvation Army with evangelical overtures or overtly religious 
demonstrations. However, an examination of the Salvation Army’s origins and history 
reveals the organization firmly identifies itself first and foremost as a Christian 
organization. In 2006, Associated Press writer Richard Ostling defined the Salvation 
Army not as a charity, but a “small, distinctly conservative Protestant denomination that 
sponsors a massive and expanding philanthropic empire” (Gariepy, 2009, p. xv). The 
philanthropy most popularly associated with the Salvation Army is secondary in 
importance as an extension of its core mission of evangelical Christianity. 
The 2008 booklet, The Salvation Army in the Body of Christ, an Ecclesiological 
Statement, emphasizes this religious focus by asserting that the Salvation Army “is an 
expression of the body of Christ on earth, the Church universal, and is a Christian 
denomination in permanent mission to the unconverted, called into and sustained in being 
by God” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 69). The Salvation Army International website proclaims that 
the organization’s overall mission “is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and to meet 
human needs in his name without discrimination,” with the objective of advancing 
Christianity and a ministry “motivated by the love of God” (The Salvation Army 
International, 2016).  
What defines the Salvation Army’s identity apart from other religious 
organizations is the manner in which its adherents exercise their beliefs. Rather than 
isolating their practices to churches or other sanctified spaces, “the Salvation Army is 
Christianity in action, Christianity with its sleeves rolled up” (Gariepy, 2009, xiv). An 
oft-repeated story popular with Salvationists describes the organization’s founder, 
William Booth, exhorting this active, hands-on mindset. According to Salvationist 
historians, Booth’s son, Bramwell, returned to the family home in London one night and 
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lamented over the number of homeless men and women he witnessed sleeping outdoors 
along the bank of the Thames. William Booth’s exclaimed response, “Go out and do 
something!” became one of the organization’s guiding values (Gariepy, 2009).   
The Salvation Army’s Christian identity and mandate to demonstrate its beliefs 
through action are key elements in understanding the Salvation Army’s evolution as an 
organization and its impact on society.   
B. WILLIAM BOOTH AND THE SALVATION ARMY’S ORIGINS 
An organization’s founders often heavily influence early formation of the group’s 
characteristics and cultural norms. Their temperament, beliefs, and leadership styles 
frequently leave near-permanent marks on the organization. The Salvation Army’s 
founder, William Booth, established the organization’s bedrock of beliefs and guided its 
trajectory during its formative years.  
Born in 1829 in Nottingham, England, Booth’s early experiences with poverty 
and faith established the beliefs he later used to mold the Salvation Army (Gariepy, 
2009). As a teenager, he joined Nottingham’s Broad Street Wesleyan Chapel and by age 
17, he led street preaching engagements and traveled long distances on Sundays to preach 
in the country (Eason & Green, 2012). The 19th-century movement of transatlantic 
revivalism heavily influenced young Booth’s approach and preaching style. American 
evangelists who toured London garnered Booth’s attention and admiration with their 
energetic, dramatic preaching style. Revivalism also encouraged missionaries to “adopt 
the dress, habitation, and customs of foreign cultures,” tactics employed both in England 
and abroad (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 132). This wider religious landscape included the 
growing popularity of Methodism. Booth shared John Wesley’s beliefs on salvation and 
holiness, which included “unlimited atonement . . . assurance of one’s salvation . . . [and] 
holy living reflected in love of God and one’s neighbor” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 17).   
However, despite his enthusiastic faith, Booth found himself disappointed by his 
fellow congregants’ reluctance to demonstrate the tenants of their faith. In 1848, he 
completed his pawnbroker apprenticeship and found himself unable to find employment. 
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During this time, despite his obvious financial struggles, “none of the wealthy members 
of his Wesleyan Broad Street Chapel offered him assistance” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 
4). This experience left an impression on Booth that compounded with later interactions 
to prompt his commitment to a distinctly active version of his faith, one practiced on the 
streets and among the poor. After marrying Catherine Mumford, a fellow evangelist, and 
moving to London, Booth’s commitment to street preaching and evangelism brought him 
into conflict with the Methodist church. Rather than relent from his full-time evangelism, 
Booth chose to break with the church (Gariepy, 2009). According to Booth, he 
experienced a flash of divine inspiration one evening as he passed the “flaming gin-
palaces” and heard a voice asking, “Where can you go and find such heathen as these, 
and where is there so great a need for your labors?”  At that moment, Booth decided, 
“those people shall be our people, and they shall have our God for their God” (Gariepy, 
2009, p. 7).   
Shortly thereafter, in August 1865, Booth printed an advertisement in Morgan and 
Chase’s periodical, requesting volunteers to join what he initially called the East London 
Christian Revival Society (Eason & Green, 2012). This marked the beginning of what 
eventually became known as the Salvation Army. In the beginning, Booth’s intentions 
were simply to organize an evangelical effort that would funnel new converts into 
existing churches, retaining only a few to continue the evangelical effort. However, the 
lower-class citizens that his organization targeted were both uncomfortable in a formal 
church environment, and often shunned by those same churches who charged pew rental 
fees to discourage lower-class penitents from breaching the decorum of their worship 
spaces (Eason & Green, 2012). By 1867, the movement grew beyond East London, and 
Booth changed the organization’s name to the Christian Mission.     
As the Christian Mission grew, it reflected the cultural trends of Victorian era by 
adopting overtly militaristic traditions and vocabulary. During this period, the concept of 
“muscular Christianity” grew in popularity and established the ideal of a soldier-saint, 
“construed as a defender of the faith who was pious and yet strong, godly, and virile” 
(Conrad & Sachsenmaier, 2007, p. 34). Not coincidentally, this image involved ties to 
British imperialism. In 1901, author James George Cotton Minchin praised “the 
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Englishman going through the world with rifle in one hand and Bible in the other,” 
asserting that “if asked what muscular Christianity has done, we point to the British 
Empire” (p. 8). Imperialism and muscular Christianity fed off one another to create a 
new, distinctly militaristic image of the ideal soldier-saint who spread both salvation and 
British dominance.   
Booth capitalized on the popularity of this lively image, and by 1878, militarism 
“became a defining feature of the organization” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 19). Evidence 
of the beginnings of this trend emerged in 1882 when a formal enrollment document bore 
the title, “Articles of War.” Pseudo military terms permeated the organization’s culture, 
with prayers referred to as “knee drills,” and the donation of members’ funds in 
envelopes called “firing cartridges” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 15). Militaristic tendencies also 
influenced the autocratic leadership embraced and promoted by Booth. He elaborated on 
this view by declaring that “only with this absolute power over men can there be 
regularity . . . this is militarism—a settled, absolute, regular system of using men to 
accomplish a settled purpose” (Conrad & Sachsenmaier, 2007, p. 35).   
The most obvious evidence of the group’s militaristic character is the final version 
of its name. According to Salvationist historians, the Christian Mission became the 
Salvation Army thanks to a spontaneous outburst from Bramwell Booth, William’s oldest 
son. Editing a draft of the Christian Mission’s annual report, Bramwell pointed to a line 
that read, “the Christian Mission is a volunteer army,” and exclaimed, “Volunteer! Here, 
I’m not a volunteer. I’m a regular or nothing!” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 9). Upon hearing this, 
Booth reached across the table with a pen, crossed out “volunteer,” and replaced it with 
“Salvation.” The organization’s title reflected how it viewed its evangelical mission as 
active warfare against sin and evil. In a description of the Salvation Army’s intent, Booth 
emphasized that in this state of war, there could be no question of each soldiers’ purpose: 
“What are you living for? . . . Is it the salvation of souls and the overthrow of the 
kingdom of evil, and the setting up of the kingdom of God? . . . If not, you may be 
religious . . . but I don’t see how you can be a Christian” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 50).   
The Salvation Army initially focused more on spiritual salvation than the social 
reform efforts it would become known for in the future. This focus owed much to the 
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theological position of millennialism, which argued that “the preaching of the gospel 
would lead to the triumph of Christianity, thereby ushering in the thousand-year period of 
blessing and prosperity promised in Revelation 20” (Eason & Green, 2012, p. 44). Booth 
subscribed to this viewpoint, believing that a strong evangelical movement could bring 
about a millennium of Christ’s rule on earth. Given this belief, it is understandable that he 
elevated spiritual warfare as the Army’s primary objective. 
However, Booth’s personal experiences with poverty and his emphasis on an 
active, in-the-trenches faith, eventually led to an increasing involvement in social reform. 
He and his followers realized that in order to bring the destitute members of English 
society to spiritual salvation, they must first find ways to relieve their “utter material 
distress” (Conrad & Sachsenmaier, 2007, p. 37). To address these worldly woes and 
disparities, Booth proposed an ambitious plan in 1890 in his book, In Darkest England 
and the Way Out. In Darkest England deliberately borrowed from the popular account of 
explorer Henry Stanley’s exploits, In Darkest Africa. Booth drew comparisons between 
Stanley’s descriptions of heathens and debauchery in Africa, and the sin and sadness 
encountered on the streets of London. He sought to capture his audience’s attention by 
asking, “as there is a darkest Africa is there not also a darkest England? . . . The ivory 
raiders who brutally traffic in the unfortunate denizens of the forest glades, what are they 
but the publicans who flourish on the weakness of our poor?” and comparing African 
streams with “the gin-shop stands on every corner with [their] River of the Water of 
Death flowing . . . for the destruction of the people” (Booth, 1890, p. 14). 
Booth identified those in need of saving from the darkest corners of England as 
the submerged tenth, a term rising from his estimates that at least one tenth of England’s 
population suffers from extreme poverty, drunkenness, and crime (Booth, 1890). His 
language describing this population reveals that “even when the Army’s activities were 
largely confined to British theaters, . . . the epistemological base of Salvationist ideology 
was significantly shaped by what has been described as imperial technologies of 
knowledge-gathering” (Conrad & Sachsenmaier, 2007, p. 30). Booth describes Britain’s 
submerged tenth as savages or heathens, using imperial imagery and rhetoric. In Darkest 
England points out the irony that churches preoccupy themselves with saving “men from 
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perdition in a world which is to come,” while doing little to change real-world conditions 
where a London cab horse receives greater care than the thousands of men and women 
sleeping on the streets (Booth, 1890, p. 16). Booth maintains his position that conversion 
and salvation are his scheme’s primary intent, but he admits that in order to achieve this 
goal, “[the submerged tenth] must be put in a position in which they can work and eat . . . 
and see something before them besides a long ,weary, monotonous, grinding round of 
toil” (p. 257).   
Booth proposed an ambition solution to help bring England’s submerged tenth 
back on their feet, to a less dire position where they would be more receptive to the 
teachings of Christ. He described in considerable detail the Salvation Army’s plan to 
establish three colonies: a city colony, a farm colony, and an overseas colony. Each 
colony would be a “self-helping and self-sustaining community, each being a kind of 
cooperative society” that provided shelter, sustenance, and work opportunities for the 
deserving poor (Booth, 1890). Booth estimated that the Salvation Army required 
approximately £1 million to fund this venture and cover start-up costs, with an additional 
£30,000 each year thereafter. Anticipating the resistance against supplying such a sum, he 
pointed out that England “pays out something like ten millions per annum in poor law 
and charitable relief without securing any real abatement of evil,” whereas his scheme 
would cost far less and with higher returns for the public welfare (p. 246). In Darkest 
England experienced widespread popularity, and the Salvation Army began receiving a 
flood of donations.   
During this time, the Army’s detractors levied claims that the organization failed 
to keep accurate accounts of their funds, and that donations intended for the colony 
scheme were being diverted for other purposes, or even pocketed by Booth himself. To 
refute these damaging claims, Booth agreed to allow an independent enquiry by a 
committee of members who were “persons whose judgment would rightly have weight 
with the community” (Coutts, 1981, p. 91). Their report, filed in 1892, concluded that the 
claims were baseless, and pointed out that the Salvation Army had made a habit of 
publishing certified balance sheets and financial statements annually since 1867 (Coutts, 
1981). Despite the committee’s validation and flow of donations, Booth’s farm and 
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overseas colonies were relatively short-lived. The city colonies enjoyed a degree of 
success, but the more lasting impact of Booth’s In Darkest England scheme was its 
influence on the Salvation Army’s approach to social reform. The scheme resulted in 
several social programs upgrading “as permanent expressions of the Army’s social work, 
transforming the Army into a major social as well as evangelical movement” (Gariepy, 
2009, p. 55). This transformation notably altered the Salvation Army’s approach to 
accomplishing its mission, further cementing its identity as a unique organization that 
waged both spiritual and practical warfare on behalf of the most destitute members of 
society. Ultimately, the early culture of the Salvation Army developed because of both 
William Booth’s personality and beliefs, and the cultural trends that permeated Victorian 
society. 
C. THE SALVATION ARMY IN AMERICA 
The Salvation Army’s transformation and evolution as an organization continued 
when it expanded to the shores of the United States in 1880. Though other Salvationists 
arrived prior to 1880, George Scott Railton and his team of seven Salvationists were the 
first group officially sanctioned by William Booth to carry the Army’s evangelical 
mission to America (Winston, 1999). Immediately upon arrival, Railton demonstrated the 
Salvation Army’s characteristic urban involvement, marching up and down streets and 
holding preaching session in saloons to reach their audience in a way that traditional 
churches did not. While religions that are more traditional aimed to protect sacred spaces, 
such as churches and temples, from secular influence, the Salvation Army operated in a 
reverse fashion and “sought to saturate the secular with the sacred” (Winston, 1999, p. 4).   
Following William Booth’s belief that all publicity was good publicity, Railton 
and his followers deliberately leveraged the commercial culture following the Industrial 
Revolution and reshaped society in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The 
American Salvation Army initially operated from New York City, then the nation’s 
cultural and commercial center (Winston, 1999). Seizing on the rising popularity and 
accessibility of entertainment for the lower classes, the Army ran contests to rewrite 
popular songs with Salvationist lyrics. They erected posters that closely resembled P.T. 
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Barnum’s, promising “men who were wild as LIONS as savage as TIGERS and as 
stubborn as old JUMBO” but had been “captured by Army troops and tamed” (Winston, 
1999, p. 17). Despite a spike of initial press coverage, overall the Army received a 
lukewarm reception during its early efforts. These troubles compounded when New York 
City’s mayor refused to allow Railton to hold open-air meetings in the streets and 
parks—only ordained ministers were allowed to exercise their religion in such a manner. 
Railton responded by briefly relocating the American Salvation Army’s headquarters to 
Philadelphia and St. Louis before returning to Brooklyn in 1882 (Coutts, 1981). Railton 
forged ahead with unrelenting enthusiasm, exploiting media and commercial trends to 
keep the Salvation Army in the headlines.   
Disputes between Railton’s successor, Thomas Moore, and William Booth 
resulted in a brief rift and secession of many of the Army’s members and property. 
Moore wanted to incorporate the Army under New York’s state laws, but Booth worried 
this would diminish the power of the Salvation Army’s International Headquarters, which 
oversaw all Army activity from London (Winston, 1999). An autocratic ruler, Booth 
would not tolerate threats to his centralized power and authority. In response to Moore’s 
secession, Booth sent his second son, Ballington Booth, and Ballington’s wife, Maude, to 
take control of the American Salvation Army in late 1886.   
The Ballington Booths guided the Army’s work in America from 1887 to 1896. 
During their tenure, the Salvation Army found acceptance into mainstream society, and 
the Army increased its involvement in social reform (Winston, 1999). The publication of 
In Darkest England formalized the Army’s social initiatives, and the Ballington Booths 
enthusiastically pursued “practical religion” that offered material aid in addition to 
spiritual salvation, notably through men’s and women’s shelters. They also opened food 
depots and rescue homes for single mothers. By 1895, the Army claimed 40,000 
Salvationists in New York, despite competing with other organizations such as the 
YMCA and institutional churches (Winston, 1999). However, as the Army experienced 
increasing acceptance into American society, it also synthesized aspects of Army and 
American culture. The Ballington Booths showed favoritism in promoting American 
officers, and habitually displayed the American flag next to the Army’s flag, known as 
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Blood and Fire (Winston, 1999). They chafed under William Booth’s autocratic 
leadership and anger at the Americanization of the Army, and eventually resigned their 
post, going on to found the Volunteers of America (Gariepy, 2009). 
Again faced with the need to replace the Salvation Army’s American leadership, 
William Booth sent his daughter Emma and her husband Frederick Tucker to fill the role 
of Commissioners. Under the Booth-Tuckers’ tenure from 1896 to 1904, the Army 
continued its shift in orientation to a “religious and philanthropic organization, as 
opposed to an evangelical mission that also attended to dire physical needs” (Winston, 
1999, p. 103). Initial efforts to conduct slum evangelism, with Salvationists moving to the 
slums, living and preaching among the people, provided lackluster results from the 
evangelical standpoint; this likely encouraged the pivot toward social reform.   
During this time, many in government and charitable institutions worried about 
the issue of separating the deserving poor—those hard-working folks capable and willing 
to extricate themselves from their situation if only given a hand up—from the unworthy 
poor—criminals and lazy folk who took advantage of charitable hand-outs without any 
desire to better themselves. To address this issue, the Salvationists developed a network 
of industrial homes, centers that provided necessities to only those residents willing to 
work for a subsistence wage. In the Salvationists’ eyes, this created a self-sorting system, 
whereby those willing to work were deserving of assistance, and those unwilling to work 
were turned away from the industrial home’s benefits (Winston, 1999).  
The expansion of social programs and facilities led to a corresponding 
requirement for the Army to develop more effective funding strategies. Unlike long-
established churches that held properties as a reliable source of revenue, the Salvation 
Army relied heavily on donations and public support during its early life. Thus, 
maintaining its image and popularity among the people was crucial to protecting its 
revenue flows. In order to garner greater public support, the Tucker-Booths began 
emphasizing the Army’s “humanitarian, nonsectarian nature” where “relief was given to 
all regardless of race, religion, or creed” (Winston, 1999, p. 123). This signaled another 
shift away from identifying as a purely evangelical organization and toward a focus on 
social reform. In 1899, the Booth-Tuckers convinced William Booth to allow the 
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incorporation of the American Salvation Army into the state of New York, under a 
special act that granted it concessions similar to the Catholic Church and protected the 
overarching authority of the Army’s International Headquarters (Winston, 1999).    
Experiments with fundraising efforts during this period led to one of the most 
iconic images for the American Salvation Army. In 1891, a Salvationist soldier named 
Joseph McFee decided to raise money to provide Christmas dinner for the poor in San 
Francisco. He hung a large crab pot on a busy street with the sign “Fill the Pot for the 
Poor—Free Dinner on Christmas Day,” and collected enough to feed more than 1,000 
people (Winston, 1999). This spontaneous act led to the Booth-Tuckers to deliberately 
position the Salvation Army as a Christmas charity, seizing on the chance to balance out 
growing consumerism by providing an easy method for shoppers and theatergoers to 
assuage uneasy consciences. Another attempt to fund Army operations emerged when the 
Booth-Tuckers established two for-profit companies: the Reliance Trading Company and 
the Salvation Army Industrial Homes Company. Each achieved positive flows of 
revenue, but administration headaches and public criticism of the propriety of running 
for-profit companies led to their dissolution by 1912 (Winston, 1999). 
Evangeline Booth succeeded her sister and brother-in-law as U.S. Commissioner 
in 1904. She held the position through both world wars, and under her leadership, the 
Salvation Army matured from a religious movement supported by energetic evangelism, 
to a philanthropic organization capable of sustaining itself beyond initial fervor. As part 
of this necessary transition, the Army became more institutionalized, with “the creation 
of a bureaucracy, a funding strategy, and an organizational ethos” (Winston, 1999, p. 
176). Evangeline divided the country into Eastern and Western divisions to facilitate 
administration efforts and made a concerted effort to acquire properties in order to 
stabilize the Army’s revenue streams. In 1890, the American Salvation Army owned 27 
properties; 10 years later, it owned 159 (Winston, 1999, p. 171).   
When the United States entered World War I, Evangeline seized on the 
opportunity to both serve the public and bring the Salvation Army’s name to the forefront 
of good-news stories about the war. Young female Salvationists arrived in Europe, ready 
to do what they could to lift the troops’ spirits. However, instead of overtly evangelizing, 
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they hit upon the wildly popular idea of baking fresh doughnuts and delivering them to 
troops as close to the front lines as they could. The media seized on the story of the 
doughnut gals, and publicity firmly established the Salvation Army’s position as “a 
religiously inspired organization that provided services that reflected Americans’ most 
cherished ideals: God, family, and country” (Winston, 1999, p. 189). The Army’s success 
in World War I placed it on firm ground financially, but the trade-off involved another 
step toward philanthropy, with less emphasis on evangelism. This trend continued during 
the Great Depression, when the Army found itself “in a culture becoming ever less 
comfortable with public expressions of religious particularity” and struggled to balance 
its evangelical and social aims (Winston, 1999, p. 228).   
During World War II, the Salvation Army worked with six other organizations to 
form the United Service Organization, commonly known as the USO. The organization 
provided welfare, recreation, and religious services to troops both at home and abroad 
during the war, and the USO remains one of the largest interfaith programs (Gariepy, 
2009). However, this team effort diluted the Salvation Army’s ability to garner publicity 
with an iconic image as it did during the First World War. As a result, at the conclusion 
of the war, the Salvation Army was “revered and respected as an American institution,” 
but “no longer a vital symbol of the nation’s religious and patriotic consensus” (Winston, 
1999, p. 242). By 1950, the Salvation Army had achieved success integrating itself into 
American society, but its identity shifted and evolved as a result.   
The Salvation Army now achieved its goal of saving souls less through roadside 
preaching and more by setting an example through its actions. However, despite this 
shift, it remained steadfast in its commitment to Christian values, giving up a $100,000 
grant to feed the elderly in Harlem, New York in the early 1970s, when city officials 
demanded that the Army cease the practice of saying grace before meals and singing 
hymns during dinner (Gariepy, 2009). Another conflict between the secular and the 
sacred occurred in 2004, when the New York Civil Liberties Union sued the Army over 
its practice of asking applicants their religious affiliation and frequency of church 
attendance in order to work in a government-funded social services program for children. 
The two parties eventually reached a settlement in 2014, designed to protect the Salvation 
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Army’s “right to practice and promote its religion while ensuring that it will not use 
government money to discriminate or indoctrinate” (“NYCLU Settlement,” 2014). These 
conflicts demonstrate that, despite the evolution required to merge with American 
society, tension still exists between the American Salvation Army’s evangelical Christian 
mission and an increasingly secular society. 
D. MODERN STRUCTURE 
Prior to William Booth’s death in 1912, he identified his son Bramwell as his 
successor. Both William and Bramwell favored an autocratic line of succession, with the 
current general of the Salvation Army naming his successor. However, when both 
William and Bramwell suffered injuries from a car accident, high-level staff members 
convinced them that there was a need for a back-up method of selecting the next leader. 
This argument resulted in the creation of the High Council (Gariepy, 2009). The High 
Council, composed of commissioners and territorial commanders, held the power to 
remove any incumbent general if he or she became unfit to oversee the Army’s 
operations. Though initially designed as a safety net for emergencies, many Salvationists 
(including Booth’s daughter Evangeline) felt a growing discontent with the autocratic 
style of governance. In 1929, after Bramwell refused to consider an alternative to 
autocratic succession, the first High Council convened and voted to depose him (Gariepy, 
2009). 
Following this precedent, the next Salvation Army general worked with 
Parliament to pass the Salvation Army Act of 1931, which formally granted the High 
Council the sole authority to elect new generals, and placed control of properties and 
capital assets with a trustee company, rather than in the trusteeship of the general 
(Gariepy, 2009). This reduced the degree of autocracy at the Army’s highest levels, but 
did not completely eliminate its centralized structure. As of September 2016, the High 
Council forms only to hold elections, similar to the College of Cardinals in the Catholic 
Church; “it is not a governing body of the Salvation Army, and has no continuity between 
meetings” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 90). There is only one general in the Salvation Army, and 
he or she serves as the international leader of the entire organization, working out of 
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International Headquarters in London. Salvation Army officers are fully ordained 
ministers, commissioned to work full-time for the Army’s interests, and church members 
are referred to as soldiers (Gariepy, 2009). 
The International Headquarters provides overall strategic leadership, supports the 
general’s intent, and designates international policy. It controls many high-level 
appointments, and “coordinates the worldwide sharing of financial resources, knowledge, 
and expertise” (Gariepy, 2009). This centralized coordination is crucial to maintain a 
unified overall effort since as of 2016, the Salvation Army operates in 127 countries 
(Maxwell, 2015). However, despite this centralized leadership, administration of 
individual countries and territories is handled through a more localized chain of 
command. Salvation Army leaders in charge of countries hold the rank of colonel, 
although leadership of a larger country warrants the title of commissioner. Most countries 
are also referred to as territories, although larger countries, such as the United States, may 
be divided into multiple territories for ease of administration and coordination. The 
Salvation Army in the United States divided into four territories: Central, Eastern, 
Southern, and Western. Territories are further subdivided into divisions, and divisions 
contain corps and community service centers. Corps are community churches, which 
conduct religious services, Sunday schools, and club meetings, seeking to spread the 
Army’s spiritual message. Community service centers handle local social reform 
programs, including emergency assistance, addiction counseling, homeless and domestic 
violence assistance, and other similar programs (The Salvation Army Australia Southern 




Figure 6.  Salvation Army Organizational Strucutre. Source: The Salvation 
Army Australia Southern Territory (2016). 
E. SALVATION ARMY WORLD SERVICE OFFICE 
As the Salvation Army expanded to an ever-growing number of international 
locations, it slowly shifted from an imperial approach to a more localized method of 
working within communities to deliver effective social services. Given the tremendous 
poverty of many of the countries in dire need of the Army’s services, the United States’ 
National Headquarters created the Salvation Army World Service Office in 1977. In 
cooperation with the International Headquarters’ International Planning and Development 
Department, SAWSO worked to provide financial, material, and personnel support to 
poorer nations (Merritt, 2006). For the first three years of SAWSO’s existence, it relied 
on a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to 
“serve as a conduit for government and internal funds sponsoring aid and self-help 
projects in developing countries” (Gariepy, 2009, p. 196). SAWSO exists as an 
independent 501(c)(3) organization, meaning it is tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of 
the Internal Revenue Code due to its operations as a charitable organization (IRS, 2016a). 
SAWSO’s headquarters reside in Alexandria, Virginia, where its small staff 
works with the Salvation Army’s “international network of facilities and personnel of 
50,000 indigenous Salvation Army officers, employees, and professional staff working in 
developing countries” (Merritt, 2006). SAWSO acts as the international arm of the 
American Salvation Army, coordinating operations and funding for a variety of projects. 
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These projects include capacity building, income generation, education, health services, 
and relief and reconstruction assistance. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, 
SAWSO offers material assistance such as food, clothing, and medical care, and it may 
also support long-term assistance, including housing reconstruction and income-
generation projects (Merritt, 2006). Given that “two-thirds of overseas support [for 
Salvation Army operations] are provided by the United States,” SAWSO plays a crucial 
role in coordinating international aid and disaster relief efforts for the American Salvation 
Army (Gariepy, 2009, p. 113). 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY CONCLUSIONS 
This brief examination of the SAWSO’s organizational history reveals that it is a 
flexible organization, capable of both influencing and being influenced by societal trends 
and developments. However, no entity can entirely remove itself from its history. 
William Booth’s policies and beliefs, combined with trends of the Victorian era, left a 
permanent mark on the Army’s institutional DNA. This includes a focus on evangelical 
Christianity, which governs the Salvation Army’s overarching purpose: to preach the 
Christian gospel and bring salvation to the world, one soul at a time. This religious 
impetus may give rise to conflict and complications when the SAWSO executes its 
mission among less-than-receptive audiences. However, the other half of Booth’s legacy, 
one of philanthropy and social reform, found fertile ground in which to expand, 
particularly in the American Salvation Army. This devotion to taking action among those 
most in need of assistance offers a compelling and admirable example of the good a 
religious organization can accomplish. Over time, as the Army’s evangelical methods 
attenuated, its social reform programs expanded. Spreading interest in its faith by 
modeling good Christian behavior is perhaps a more powerful, and certainly more 
amenable method for SAWSO to carry out its mission throughout the world.   
Though William Booth’s version of autocratic rule diluted in the decades 
following his death, the Salvation Army remains a hierarchical and centralized 
institution. Government and non-government agencies coordinating with the Salvation 
Army would do well to take note of this, and ensure they know what authority to 
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communicate with in order to affect change or execute a mission. In particular, military 
forces may find a degree of common ground with Salvationists due to their militaristic 
structure; this is especially applicable to interactions with SAWSO, due to its high degree 
of financial and material involvement in international aid operations. History seldom 
remains dormant; its influence extends into the present, shaping actions, decisions, and 
behavior. Leaders interacting with SAWSO must consider the organization through the 




V. DISASTER RELIEF CAPABILITIES DATA COLLECTION 
A. DATA COLLECTION NOTES 
As of 2015, SAWSO’s operations fall under three program services: health 
programs, livelihood and anti-human trafficking, and relief and reconstructions services. 
Per the 2015 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-133 Financial Report, 
SAWSO defines relief and reconstruction services as the provision of “material 
assistance, such as food, clothing, and medical care, in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster,” along with promoting and supporting “longer-term assistance such as housing 
reconstruction and income generation for those affected by disasters.”  This includes 
assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).  
As the international arm of the Salvation Army in the United States, SAWSO only 
operates its program services outside the United States (“SAWSO: Serving a world,” 
2008). Generally, SAWSO provides funds to less-developed countries in advance of 
incurred expenses, and those countries apply the funds toward program services (The 
Salvation Army World Service Office [SAWSO], 2004). The key enabling feature behind 
SAWSO’s ability to provide its services is the Salvation Army’s international presence, 
its “existing infrastructure and footprint” that allows integration with local organizational 
infrastructure (“SAWSO: Serving a World,” 2008). The close integration between 
SAWSO and local Salvation Army units made it difficult to separate qualitative 
capability data by organizational entities. To mitigate the chance of collecting data from 
Salvation Army disaster relief activities that did not involve SAWSO, this report focuses 
on disaster relief operations identified in SAWSO’s 2003–2015 OMB Circular A-133 
Financial Reports as Temporarily Restricted Net Assets. While SAWSO may have 
contributed resources to other disaster relief efforts, to maintain accuracy, this report 
collects data from only operations specifically identified in the financial reports. 
The following sections of this chapter present qualitative data collected on 




The following disaster events were analyzed to determine SAWSO’s capabilities 
in the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR): the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and 
tsunami, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, the 2008 Myanmar cyclone (Cyclone Nargis), the 
2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, and the 2015 Nepal 
earthquake.  
During the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, SAWSO funding assisted 
relief activities in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India (The Salvation Army, 2005). The 
immediate response involved the provision of food, clothing, water, temporary shelter, 
household supplies, and health care (including medical exams, referrals, and clinics) to 
10,000 beneficiaries. This included the construction of five houses, and the repair of 200 
structures. SAWSO’s funding contributed to the building of 11 wells and 10 water tanks, 
which served 3,400 affected persons (The Salvation Army, 2005). Additionally, the 
Salvation Army conducted health clinics and medical exams. As the focus shifted to 
long-term recovery, SAWSO became a lead partner on four of seven projects expected to 
take between three and 36 months, including a “large agriculture and food production 
project” (The Salvation Army, 2005).   
When the Sichuan earthquake struck in May of 2008, the Salvation Army 
assigned three relief teams to the region to provide an initial response that included the 
distribution of “food, drinking water, water purification pills, surgical masks, and plastic 
gloves” (“Sichuan Earthquake,” 2008). Also in 2008, the Salvation Army supported relief 
efforts following Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar by distributing 6,000 kilos of rice and 
3,000 kilos of noodles, along with basic supplies (food, tarps, water, clothing) for 11,000 
people (Gleason, 2008). 
After the 2011 earthquake and tsunami struck Japan, SAWSO contributed funding 
to a number of recovery projects. The Salvation Army territorial commander for Japan, 
Commissioner Makoto Yoshida, emphasized that it would be “more efficient for disaster 
relief agencies to purchase needed resources locally” through international donations, as 
opposed to shipping items in-kind (SalArmy, 2011). Initial response efforts involved the 
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provision of a portable canteen, blankets, pre-packaged meals and bottled water, home 
heaters, and bicycles. With a focus on restoring the livelihood of the local economy, the 
Salvation Army also donated “300 bicycles, 30 fishing boats, and 550 life vests, rubber 
gloves, and boots for fishermen” (“The Salvation Army in Japan,” 2012).   
Longer term recovery projects in Japan focused on economic development and 
community outreach. Community outreach programs sought to provide emotional and 
spiritual support and counseling services, particularly to the more vulnerable members of 
society such as children and the elderly (“The Salvation Army in Japan,” 2012). 
Community development projects funded by SAWSO included afterschool programs for 
children in Onagawa and senior learning opportunities (SAWSO, 2016). SAWSO also 
contributed to economic development by providing fishermen’s unions in Kesennuma 
and Onagawa with trucks, forklifts, diving gear, and other equipment (SAWSO, 2016).  
When Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in 2013, SAWSO responded with 
funding to provide “food, water, shelter repair materials, and medical services” (SAWSO, 
2014a). The Salvation Army also conducted an aerial survey with partners such as the 
World Food Program to assess the damage (Murray, 2013). SAWSO’s funding enabled 
the distribution of 14,000 relief packs to disaster victims in Tacloban, Dulag, and North 
Cebu. In coordination with partner NGOs, their efforts included medical care, 
vaccinations, counseling, dental care, and hygiene kit distribution to 45 villages 
(SAWSO, 2014). Thanks to partnership with UPS, the Salvation Army delivered over 
one million meals to survivors; this was largely accomplished through family packs that 
feed roughly five people three meals a day for seven days (Murray, 2013). Finally, 
SAWSO contributed to long-term sustainability by distributing 223,256 coconut tree 
seedlings to 39 villages in Leyte (SAWSO, 2014b).  
In 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal. The Salvation Army launched 
an assessment team that walked nearly 70 kilometers at high altitudes to conduct a survey 
of Nepalese villages that were inaccessible by road (“Salvation Army Response Team,” 
2015). Following its assessments, SAWSO funding “supported the development of 
temporary housing and learning centers,” as well as the distribution of 3,700 tarps, 881 
tents, 208 metric tons of food, and 3,000 gallons of oil to fuel lamps (The Salvation Army 
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World Service Office, 2015). Their funding also contributed to 3,000 temporary 
structures for housing and 850 educational packs for children returning to recently 
repaired classrooms (SAWSO, 2015a). Crucially, SAWSO partnered with other 
organizations such as The UPS (United Postal Service) Foundation, FedEx, Mountain 
Child, and Mission Aviation Fellowship to supply household items, construct septic tanks 
and toilets, manage refugee camps, and travel within the disaster area (SAWSO, 2015b).   
C. SOUTHCOM 
The following disaster events were analyzed to determine SAWSO’s capabilities 
in the SOUTHCOM AOR: the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2010 Chile earthquake.  
Three days after a 7.0 magnitude struck Haiti, the Salvation Army assessment 
team arrived and coordinated with government and military agencies to obtain clearance 
for relief flights into the Port-au-Prince airport. Additionally, Salvation Army units 
established staging areas for supplies in south Florida (The Salvation Army, Australia, 
2010). SAWSO’s funding supplied food, water, and medical services. Within one year 
after the earthquake, the Salvation Army had distributed 7.9 million meals, 1.5 million 
gallons of fresh water, 83,000 mosquito nets, 8,100 cots, 8,000 cleaning kits, 7,600 
personal hygiene kits, 4,000 tarps, 4,000 solar lights, 5,000 tents, and 606 transitional 
shelters (GiveWell, 2011). Partnership with UPS assisted in at least one major shipment 
of these items (The Salvation Army, Australia, 2010). The packaged meals were prepared 
in partnership with Numana, Inc., and consisted of “rice, soya, freeze-dried vegetables 
with chicken flavoring, and 21 vitamins targeted to help the immune system” (“Ten 
Millionth Meal,” 2010). 
Additionally, the United Nations Shelter Cluster designated the Salvation Army 
as the lead agency for an IDP camp adjacent to the Army’s compound, and SAWSO 
provided funding and support for the 20,000 camp residents. This included providing 
security, clean water, sanitation, and medical care for camp residents (SAWSO, 2010b). 
Medical care included “exams, lab testing, the provision of drugs, and disease 
monitoring” (SAWSO, 2010b). Eight Salvation Army doctors from the United States 
established two surgical rooms to care for major injuries (The Salvation Army, Australia, 
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2010). Initial aid included setting broken bones, limb amputations, and delivering babies 
(SAWSO, 2010a). A 10,000-gallon water purification system was utilized in the camp, 
which as located on and around a large soccer field in Port-au-Prince (The Salvation 
Army, Australia, 2010).  
SAWSO also provided transitional shelters, built through a cash-for-work 
program that benefited the local economy by training 400 Haitians as carpenters and 
construction crew-members. Under this program, 45 construction crews built 600 new 
homes, with most shelters completed within one day (SAWSO, 2010a). During the three 
years following the earthquake, long-term projects funded by SAWSO included housing 
reconstruction, vocational training, income generation, and community development 
programs implemented in 50 Haitian communities (SAWSO, 2014a).  
When an earthquake and tsunami struck Chile in February of 2010, SAWSO 
provided new homes and repair materials to 40 families (SAWSO, 2014a), as well as 
tents to temporarily house 60 families near Concepcion (“Salvation Army expands,” 
2010). The Salvation Army also delivered blankets, mattresses, and food to the affected 
area; in particular, emergency canteens were dispatched from the United States to serve 
as mobile kitchens in hard-hit areas (“Salvation Army in Chile,” 2014). The canteens are 
powered by a generator and onboard propane and water tanks that allow them to operate 
independently. Each canteen is equipped with a “six-burner commercial stove, two 
convection ovens, a grill, and two 1,000 watt microwave ovens,” along with a refrigerator 
and sink, and is capable of preparing up to 3,000 meals a day (Lovin, 2010). 
D. EUCOM 
This section analyzes SAWSO’s response to the European refugee crisis between 
2014 and 2015 to determine its capabilities in the EUCOM AOR. When conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine forced thousands to leave their homes, SAWSO offered support through 
three types of food packages, including one with dry food that would support a family for 
one week, ready-to-eat food for IDPs in-transit, and dry baby food for infants (SAWSO, 
2014a). As refugees fled Syria and North Africa, the Salvation Army provided assistance 
in 14 different countries, including Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
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Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (“Salvation Army Continues,” 2016). Support 
included providing food, clothing, emotional and spiritual support, language classes, 
temporary shelter, hygiene items, and medical and legal support (“Salvation Army 
Continues,” 2016).  
In Greece, SAWSO’s funding contributed to a day center with “toilets, shower 
facilities, basic medical care, and communications services for refugees arriving at the 
port of Piraeus in Athens” (SAWSO, 2015a). The organization’s efforts in Germany 
consisted of the establishment of a thrift store in Leipzig, which provided furnishings for 
refugees’ apartments (“Salvation Army Continues,” 2016).  
E. AFRICOM 
This section analyzes SAWSO’s response to the East Africa famine in 2011 and 
the Central African Republic refugee crisis of 2014 to determine the organization’s 
disaster response capabilities in the AFRICOM AOR. A series of droughts and floods 
contributed to famine in East Africa in 2011. During its initial response to the crisis, the 
Salvation Army provided 5,000 affected persons with enough food to last one month, in 
the form of a 50-kilogram bag of maize and three liters of cooking oil. This initial 
distribution phase focused on the more vulnerable members of the population, such as the 
elderly, nursing mothers, and the disabled (Ndeta, 2011). Later phases sought to acquire 
beans to add to future food packages. To address areas stricken by drought, the Salvation 
Army used water tanks pulled by tractors and installed rainwater-harvesting tanks to 
provide water for drinking, cooking, and school sanitation in rural primary schools (“The 
Salvation Army Is Responding,” 2011).  
In response to refugees fleeing to the Republic of Congo to escape conflict in the 
Central African Republic, the Salvation Army supplied 1,051 women and babies with 
“canned food, hygiene items, mosquito nets, clothing, and blankets” in coordination with 
other humanitarian organizations (SAWSO, 2014a).  
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F. CENTCOM 
This section analyzes SAWSO’s response to the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and 
2010 floods in Pakistan to determine its disaster response capabilities in the CENTCOM 
AOR. During the initial response to the earthquake, a Salvation Army team drove over 
100 kilometers to bring 92 tents, 250 family packs with rations, plates, cooking utensils, 
water, and 300 blankets to the affected area (The Salvation Army, n.d.). Follow-up efforts 
focused on providing 300 winterized shelters, 1,700 additional tents, sewing machines, 
blankets, and school supplies (“Salvation Army Earthquake Relief,” 2006). In 2010, 
heavy rains caused flooding, which the Salvation Army responded to by providing quilts, 
pillows, mattresses, tents, and kitchen utensils to families (“Salvation Army Flood 
Relief,” 2010).  
G. DATA SUMMARY 
Table 2 establishes a sense of scale for SAWSO’s relief efforts by presenting the 
qualitative data collected for each disaster with the number of persons affected and 
damage caused by each disaster event. For the European refugee crisis, numbers were 
calculated by adding the number of non-European Union asylum seekers for countries 
where SAWSO was active in 2014 and 2015, as compiled by the EuroStat Statistics 
Explained website (EuroStat, 2016).   
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Table 2.   Disaster Scale versus SAWSO Relief Efforts.  
 
Data for the total affected and total damage for every disaster except the European refugee crisis and Central 
African Republic Refugee crisis come from Guha-Sapir, Below, & Hoyois (2016); for total affected by the 
European refugee crisis, data come from “Asylum Statistics” (2016); and for total affected by the Central 
African Republic refugee crisis, data come from United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (2016).  
CENTCOM Year(s) Disaster  Total 
Affected 
 Total Damage 
(USD) 
SAWSO Assistance
Provided 10,000 people with food, clothing, water, temporary shelter, household supplies, & health care 
("East Asian," 2005)
Constructed 5 houses & repaired 200 structures ("East Asian," 2005)
Served 3,400 people by building 11 wells and 10 water tanks ("East Asian," 2005)
Lead partner on 4 of 7 long-term recovery projects, including an agriculture & food production ("East 
Asian, 2005)
2008 Sichuan Earthquake 45,976,596 85,000,000,000$   





2,420,000   4,000,000,000$     Provided 11,000 people with rice (6,000 kg), noodles (3,000 kg), tarps, water, & clothing (Gleason, 2008)
Provided a portable canteen, blankets, pre-packaged meals, bottled water, home heaters, & bicycles 
("The Salvation Army in Japan," 2012)
Donated 300 bicycles, 30 fishing boats, 550 life vests, rubber gloves, & boots for fishermen ("The 
Salvation Army in Japan," 2012)
Provided after-school programs, counseling, spiritual, and emotional support, with particular focus on 
children & the elderly ("The Salvation Army in Japan," 2012)
Provided trucks, forklifts, & diving gear for fishermen's unions ("Five years later," 2016)
Provided food, water, shelter repair materials, & medical services (OMB Circular A-133, 2014)
Distributed 14,000 relief packs (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 2014)
Provided medical care, vaccinations, counseling, dental care, & hygiene kit distribution for 45 villages (The 
Salvation Army World Service Office, 2014)
Delivered 1 million meals via family packs (Murray, 2013)
Distributed 223,256 coconut seedlings to 39 villages (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 2014)
Distributed 3,700 tarps, 881 tents, 208 metric tons of food, & 3,000 gal of oil for lamps (OMB Circular A-
133, 2015)
Funded 3,000 temporary structures & 850 educational packs (The Salvation Army World Service Office, 
2015)
Supplied household items, constructed septic tanks, managed refugee camps (The Salvation Army World 
Service Office, 2015)
Coordinated with HN to obtain clearance for relief flights (The Salvation Army, Australia, 2010)
Distributed 7.9 million meals, 1.5 million gal of water, 83,000 mosquito nets, 8,100 cots, 8,000 cleaning 
kits, 7,600 personal hygiene kits, 4,000 tarps, 4,000 solar lights, 5,000 tents, 606 transitional shelters 
(GiveWell, 2011)
Provided 20,000 IDP camp residents with security, clean water, sanitation, & medical care (OMB Circular A-
133, 2010)
Trained 400 Haitians as carpenters & construction crew members to build 600 new homes (The Salvation 
Army World Service Office, 2010)
Implemented long-term projects for housing reconstruction, vocational training, income generation, & 
community development in 50 communities (OMB Circular A-133, 2014)
Provided 40 families with new homes & repair materials, and tents for 60 families (OMB Circular A-133, 
2014)
Dispatched emergency canteens capable of preparing 3,000 meals/day (Lovin, 2010)
Delivered blankets & mattresses ("Salvation Army in Chile," 2014)
Provided food, clothing, emotional & spiritual support, language classes, temporary shelter, hygiene 
items, & medical & legal support ("Salvation Army continues," 2016)
Offered food packages for families, IDPs, and infants (OMB Circular A-133, 2014)
Funded a center with toilets, shower facilities, basic medical care, & communications services (OMB 
Circular, A-133, 2015)
Established a thrift store with furnishings for refugees' apartments ("Salvation Army continues," 2016)
Provided 5,000 people with food for 1 month via 50kg bag of maize & 3L cooking oil (Ndeta, 2011)
Provided water for drinking, cooking, & school sanitation via tractor-pulled and rainwater-harvesting 
tanks ("The Salvation Army is responding," 2011)
2014
Central African Republic 
Refugee Crisis
423,757      N/A
Provided 1,051 women & babies with canned food, hygiene items, mosquito nets, clothing, & blankets 
(OMB Circular A-133, 2014)
2005 Kashmir Earthquake 5,128,309   5,200,000,000$     
Supplied 1,792 tents, 300 winterized shelters, 250 family packs of rations, cooking utensils, & water, 300 
blankets, sewing machines, blankets, & school supplies ("Kashmir earthquake," 2005)
2010 Pakistan Floods 20,363,496 9,500,000,000$     Provided quilts, pillows, mattresses, tents, & kitchen utensils ("Salvation Army flood relief," 2010)
3,700,000   8,000,000,000$     
Chile Earthquake
2011 East Africa Famine 10,038,097 N/A
2010
2,671,556   30,000,000,000$   
EUCOM 2014–15 European Refugee Crisis 1,575,985   N/A
16,106,870 10,000,000,000$   
2015 Nepal Earthquake 5,639,722   5,174,000,000$     
368,820      210,000,000,000$ 
2004
Indian Ocean Earthquake 
& Tsunami











VI. CAPABILITY ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This section of the report analyzes the data gathered in Chapter V to evaluate 
SAWSO’s capabilities by COCOM. Such an analysis provides military commanders and 
other relevant parties a region-specific summary of SAWSO’s capabilities. The 
Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF 
Commanders and Below) (DOD, 2011) offers guidance on how to conduct the analysis 
by noting the importance of using internationally accepted metrics to “capture and 
demonstrate [the] level of effort/need and measures of performance/effectiveness.” This 
section applies metrics by adapting the criteria developed by Harper et al. (2013) to 
assess SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities using the Sphere Handbook.  
B. THE SPHERE PROJECT 
In 1997, a group of humanitarian NGOs and the International Red Cross 
collaborated on a project designed to improve disaster response operations, and hold 
organizations accountable for their performance. The guiding philosophy behind their 
efforts rested on two core beliefs: “first, that those affected by disaster or conflict have 
the right to life with dignity and therefore, a right to assistance; and second, that all 
possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of disaster or 
conflict” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 4). The fruit of the group’s labor was The Sphere 
Project Handbook, first published in 2000, which laid out a humanitarian charter and 
established evidence-based minimum standards in response areas. A benefit of using 
these standards is that “because it is not owned by any one organization, the Handbook 
enjoys broad acceptance by the humanitarian sector” and “has become one of the most 
widely known and internationally recognized sets of standards for humanitarian 
response” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 5).  
 52 
C. SPHERE PROJECT MINIMUM STANDARDS 
The Sphere Project developed a set of qualitative and universal minimum 
standards that “cover activities which meet the urgent survival needs of the disaster-
affected population” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 9). In particular, these activities 
include four lifesaving areas: water supply, sanitation, and hygiene promotion (WASH); 
food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement, and non-food items; and health action. 
Appendix B describes these standards in detail per the Sphere Handbook. In general, 
WASH minimum standards include requirements for WASH and hygiene promotion, 
water supply, excreta disposal, vector control, solid waste management, and drainage. 
Food security and nutrition covers assessment, infant and young child feeding, the 
management of acute malnutrition, general food security, cash and voucher transfers, and 
livelihoods. Shelter, settlement, and non-food items include shelter and settlement, and 
clothing, bedding, and household items. Finally, health action minimum standards consist 
of requirements for health systems, essential health services, control of communicable 
diseases, child health, sexual and reproductive health, injuries, mental health, and non-
communicable diseases (The Sphere Project, 2011).  
D. SPHERE ANALYSIS 
Using the Sphere Project’s minimum standard criteria as a guide, this section 
follows modified version of the methodology developed by Harper et al. (2013) to assign 
SAWSO scores for its disaster relief capabilities in each COCOM.1  SAWSO received a 
score for each sub-category based on the proportion of standards met. For example, in 
PACOM, SAWSO met five out of six standards for general food security, translating to a 
score of 0.83. Each sub-category’s scores were summed and divided by the total number 
of sub-categories to provide an overall score for each major performance measure that 
represents the proportion of capabilities SAWSO possesses in each area. This analysis 
operates conservatively under the assumption that it is better to list only those capabilities 
                                                 
1 The broader scoring method used by Harper et al. (2013) assigned a score of 1 if an organization met 
at least 50% of Sphere minimum standards, and a score of 0 if it met less than 50% of minimum standards 
for each category. 
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specifically identified in the source data, rather than making overly generous assumptions 
about SAWSO’s resources.  
1. Sphere Analysis Results 
The results of the Sphere analysis for SAWSO’s activities are presented in Table 
3 and Table 4. Table 3 presents a summary of SAWSO’s scores for each of Sphere’s 
major areas for disaster relief. For example, in PACOM, SAWSO earned a score of 0.80 
in shelter, settlement, and non-food items, but demonstrated a capability to meet less than 
40% of the standards for other major areas. This provides an at-a-glance review of 
SAWSO’s regional capabilities for commanders. 
Table 3.   SAWSO Sphere Scorecard Summary. 
 
 
Table 4 offers amplifying information for SAWSO’s scores by expanding on how 
the organization fared in each major area’s sub-categories. SAWSO may earn relatively 
low scores in major areas, such as food security and nutrition, but a more detailed 
examination reveals that it consistently maintains the capability to provide support in the 
sub-category of general food security. 
COCOM WASH Food Security & Nutrition
Shelter, Settlement, & 
Non-Food Items
Health Action
PACOM 0.36 0.25 0.80 0.33
SOUTHCOM 0.29 0.17 0.70 0.42
EUCOM 0.14 0.22 0.50 0.25
AFRICOM 0.21 0.31 0.20 0.00
CENTCOM 0.10 0.11 0.60 0.00
Score
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Table 4.   SAWSO Detailed Sphere Scorecard. 
 
 
2. Sphere Analysis Conclusions 
In PACOM, SAWSO received its strongest score of 0.80 in the overall category 
of shelter, settlement, and non-food items. It earned 0.36 in WASH, stemming primarily 
from proficiencies in WASH promotion, hygiene promotion, and excreta disposal. While 
it received a 0.25 in food security and nutrition, SAWSO scored well in general food 
security and livelihoods. The data failed to provide evidence of an ability to treat acute 
malnutrition, but SAWSO is well-equipped to distribute basic food packages and support 
recovery for local produce or fishing economies. Additionally, while SAWSO offers 
medical exams, clinics, and vaccinations during disaster operations in PACOM, there was 
PACOM SOUTHCOM EUCOM AFRICOM CENTCOM
WASH Promotion 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hygiene Promotion 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00
Water Supply 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.67
Excreta Disposal 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00
Vector Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Solid Waste Management 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Drainage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 0.36 0.29 0.14 0.21 0.10
Nutrition Assessment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Infant & Young Child 
Feeding
0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00
Management of Acute 
Malnutrition & 
Micronutrient Deficiencies
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Food Security: General 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.67
Food Security: Cash & 
Voucher Transfers
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Food Security: Livelihoods 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.31 0.11
Shelter & Settlement 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.00 0.60
Non-Food Items 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.60
Total 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.20 0.60
Health Systems 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
Essential Health Services 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Control of Communicable 
Diseases
0.33 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
Child Health 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sexual & Reproductive 
Health
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Injury 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mental Health 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Non-Communicable 
Diseases
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00










not enough evidence to conclude a health action capability beyond relatively basic care, 
earning an overall score of 0.33. 
In SOUTHCOM, SAWSO again demonstrated the greatest capability in shelter, 
settlement and non-food items. Of note, its response to Haiti demonstrates a health action 
capability that includes basic and surgical-level resources, earning it a score of 0.42, the 
highest health action score achieved among the COCOMs. The data also indicates the 
capability to provide for general food security through pre-packaged meals and mobile 
canteens, along with basic hygiene promotion and water supplies. 
The capability analysis for EUCOM resulted in relatively low scores of 0.25 or 
less in each category except shelter, settlement, and non-food items, where SAWSO 
scored 0.50. However, given that this analysis considers only one disaster event, it is 
feasible that SAWSO possesses greater capability in the EUCOM AOR; prior to 
conducting disaster relief operations in the region, it is recommended that further 
research outside the scope of this report be conducted to determine the full extent of the 
organization’s capabilities. Additionally, the Salvation Army maintains a strong 
international presence in Europe, and this may account for the relatively low involvement 
from SAWSO, since local Salvation Army units operating out of more developed 
countries may issue less requests for assistance. 
In AFRICOM, SAWSO scored below 50% in each of the four main areas of the 
Sphere Project’s minimum standards. Notably, the Salvation Army demonstrates an 
ability to provide for general food security and drinking water, but the data failed to 
indicate a high enough performance in other sub-categories to warrant a higher overall 
score. Given that only two disaster events were analyzed, it is possible that SAWSO 
possesses a greater capacity than what was determined in the scope of this report. 
The analysis for CENTCOM suggests that SAWSO meets more than 50% of 
Sphere minimum standards in only the shelter, settlement, and non-food category. Similar 
to the analysis results from EUCOM and AFRICOM, the low number of events that 
SAWSO reported funding (and that were subsequently analyzed by this report) suggests 
that further research may reveal greater capabilities in the AOR.  
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VII. CORE COMPETENCY MEU COMPARISON 
This section compares SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities with an MEU’s by 
examining the core competencies identified by Apte and Yoho (2012). This comparison 
provides a context for military commanders to determine how SAWSO’s capabilities 
may complement or overlap with military capabilities during disaster response 
operations. Based on the data gathered in Chapter V and MEU capability data adapted 
from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014), this section compares 
how MEU and SAWSO core competencies vary by COCOM.  
A. CORE COMPETENCY OVERVIEW 
Disaster response operations require aid organizations to provide a variety of 
services. Figure 7 lists these essential services, as compiled by Apte and Yoho (2012). 
They tend to build on one another in a sequential fashion during disaster response 
operations, with information and knowledge management serving as the bedrock to 
developing an efficient and effective response.  
Information and knowledge management applies to competencies that aid in 
developing situational awareness in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Developing a 
clear picture of the disaster’s impact is critical for needs assessment. Needs assessment 
analyzes available information to forecast demand for the affected population, and 
develop a plan to meet that demand with available resources. According to Apte and 
Yoho (2012), “the supply capability involves procurement, staging, warehousing, and 
inventory management.” In order to actually distribute those supplies to the affected 
population, the core competency of deployment and distribution must be present.  
Health service support involves medical capabilities that run the gamut from the 
provision of general medical supplies and basic care, to specific requirements based on 
disaster and population characteristics, such as a requirement for cholera vaccines (Apte 
& Yoho, 2012). The capability to collaborate and provide governance involves both 
coordination between agencies, and the establishment of command and control to 
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establish a degree of order in the affected area (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Recognizing the 
importance of collaboration, the UN addressed this essential service by developing a 
cluster approach that established eleven groups, or clusters, of humanitarian organizations 
(Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 7.  Essential Services and Capabilities for Disaster Response. Source: 
Apte & Yoho (2012). 
Figure 8 links the essential services for effective disaster relief operations to both 
military and non-military core capabilities. By matching services to core capabilities, 
Apte and Yoho (2012) provide a useful tool for planners to assess, at a very general level, 
what skills various agencies may bring to disaster relief operations. This report uses the 
framework developed by Apte and Yoho (2012) to compare SAWSO’s core capabilities 
with an MEU’s as they relate to the essential services and capabilities, in order to identify 
areas of potential redundancy or where collaboration might prove particularly beneficial. 
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This figure was adapted by Apte and Yoho from Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). 
Figure 8.  Humanitarian and Military Core Competencies. 
Source: Apte & Yoho (2012). 
B. MEU CORE COMPETENCIES 
1. MEU Background 
The United States Marine Corps prides itself on the ability to rapidly employ 
combined-arms teams of air, ground, and logistic assets, known as Marine Air-Ground 
Task Forces (MAGTFs) to address threats to national security and interest throughout the 
world. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest version of a MAGTF, and 
serves as a highly capable, forward-deployed asset and includes a reinforced infantry 
battalion, mixed aircraft squadron, and a logistical support group. Traveling aboard the 
Navy’s amphibious ships, the MEU is completely self-sufficient for 15 days after landing 
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ashore. MEUs “are characterized by their sea-based forward presence, expeditionary 
nature, ability to plan for and respond to crises, combined arms integration, and their 
interoperability with joint, combined, and special operations forces” (United States 
Marine Corps [USMC], 2016).  
As highly versatile and mobile forces, MEUs often assist in disaster relief 
operations. Conducting humanitarian assistance falls specifically within the MEU’s 
mission set, and is defined as “assistance to relieve or reduce the results of natural or 
man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or 
privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or 
loss of property” (USMC, 2009). The Marine Corps recognizes the necessity of multi-
lateral coordination for disaster relief missions by emphasizing that “the assistance 
provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of host nation, civil 
authorities, and/or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing 
humanitarian assistance” (USMC, 2009). 
To accomplish its mission, the MEU consists of 2,059 Marines and sailors spread 
across its ground, logistics, aviation, and command elements. This includes operators for 
various pieces of transportation and engineering equipment such as bulldozers, an 
excavator, forklifts, medium and heavy-lift helicopters, tilt-rotor aircraft, unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), and medium-lift trucks. 
The MEU is also capable of fielding portable generators and a tactical water purification 
system (TWPS) capable of producing 24,000 gallons of potable water per day (USMC, 
2016). Table 5 offers a more comprehensive view of the basic equipment load-out for an 
MEU.  
 61 




2. MEU Core Competencies 
Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014) examined the MEU’s 
response to three major disasters to determine what demand it met in each of the essential 
services and capabilities for disaster response. The results of their studies are summarized 
in Table 6, which describes both demand fulfilled by the MEU, and unfulfilled demand 
that the MEU possessed the capability to meet. Table 6 provides a summary of the 
MEU’s core competencies as they relate to essential services and capabilities during 
disaster response operations. 
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Table 6.   MEU Resources to Deliver Essential Services and Capabilities for 
Disaster Response. Adapted from Gastrock & Iturriaga (2013) and 
Apte & Yoho (2014).  
 
 
C. CORE COMPETENCY COMPARISON 
When a disaster strikes and aid agencies arrive on the ground in the affected area, 
it is not uncommon to encounter coordination difficulties and redundant or inefficient use 
of available resources. While a portion of this confusion is probably inevitable due to the 
chaotic nature of disaster response operations, it can be mitigated by encouraging a more 
well-rounded situational awareness and understanding of each organization’s core 
competencies. For this reason, a comparison of SAWSO’s regional core competencies 
and the MEU’s resources offers commanders a useful tool to determine where SAWSO’s 
capabilities close support gaps or increase capacity. Notably, while this section suggests 
areas where the two organizations may complement one another, the MEU does not have 
authority over any element of the Salvation Army or its resources. Rather, this section is 
intended as illuminating background information for commanders and other relevant 
Essential Services & Capabilities for 
Disaster Response
Demand met by MEU
MEU Capabilities to Satisfy Unmet 
Demand
Unclassified & plain text communications S2 Intelligence section
Public affairs liaisons S6 Communications section
Social media
Rotary wing aircraft for mass distribution of 
informational materials
Rotary wing imagery Civil affairs section
Creation of crisis action team Public affairs section
Initial HAST CBRN Detachment
Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments Reconnaissance platoon
Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population Force Reconnaissance platoon
Recon teams for remote assessments/HLZ ID Infantry Battalion
Infrastructure assessment
Fuel, drinking water, food, medical supplies (2) Tactical water purifiers
Manpower for sea and air port security Infantry Battalion
Manpower and equipment for debris clearance Military Police Detachment
(4) Forklifts, (1) Bulldozer, (1) Excavator
(31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) 
AAVs
Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel (19) Rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s
Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID
(31) MTVR trucks, (105) HMMWVs, (15) 
AAVs, (4) Forklifts
Health Service Support Embedded Navy corpsmen
HAST coordination Civil affairs section
Establishment of joint HLZs Public affairs section
Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process
Civil affairs officer as liaison
Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF







audiences to serve as an informed starting point for collaboration and coordinating 
efforts.  
The following sub-sections conduct a comparison by COCOM, but one of 
SAWSO’s core competencies exists as a key resource across all locations: its network of 
local offices and employees. The Salvation Army operates in 127 countries as of 2016, 
and SAWSO links with local offices and Salvation Army members when conducting 
disaster relief operations. These offices demonstrate established ties to local communities 
and knowledge of the area and exist as a significant resource for information and 
knowledge management, needs assessment, and collaboration and governance. 
1. PACOM 
Table 7 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the PACOM area of 
responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. Analyzing the table reveals that supply, 
deployment and distribution, and health service and support are significant areas for 
coordination purposes. SAWSO’s access to additional food stores and water tanks may 
increase the MEU’s existing capacity in those areas. Additionally, the MEU’s material 
handling equipment may be useful to clear an area and assist in erecting SAWSO’s 
temporary shelters. While the MEU’s organic assets include ground and air transport 
capabilities, SAWSO offers access to increased distribution capacity through its 
partnerships with The UPS Foundation, FedEx, Mountain Child, and the Mission 
Aviation Fellowship. SAWSO also helps close the gap in health service support resources 
by providing medical exams, vaccinations, dental care, and medical supplies. This 
capability significantly improves on the MEU’s limited number of embedded Navy 
corpsmen who are primarily charged with the care of their own troops. 
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Table 7.   MEU and SAWSO Core Competencies (PACOM). 
 
Data for MEU core competencies come from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014). a 
Murray (2013); b “Salvation Army Response Team” (2015); c Gleason (2008); d The Salvation Army 
(2005); e “Sichuan Earthquake” (2008); f OMB (2015); g The Salvation Army World Service Office 
(2015); h The Salvation Army World Service Office (2014). 
 
  
Essential Services & Capabilities for 
Disaster Response
MEU Core Competencies SAWSO Core Competencies (PACOM)
Unclassified & plain text communications Local SA offices
Public and civil affairs sections
Social media
Rotary wing imagery/mass distribution of informational 
materials
Creation of crisis action team
S2 Intelligence and S6 Communications sections
Initial HAST Aerial survey conducted with partnersa
Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments Foot-mobile assessment teamb
Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population





Fuel, food Food (rice, noodles, etc.)c
Manpower for sea and air port security Temporary sheltersd
Manpower and equipment for debris clearance Household suppliesd
(2) tactical water purifiers Structural repairsd
Military police detachment Water tanksd
Infantry battalion Water purification pillse
(4) forklifts, (1) bulldozer, (1) excavator, (31) MTVR trucks, 
(105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs Lamp oil
f
Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel
Partnerships with The UPS Foundation, 
FedEx, Mountain Child, and Mission Aviation 
Fellowshipg
(19) rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) 
HMMWVs, (15) AAVs, (4) forklifts
Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID




Medical supplies (masks, plastic gloves)e
HAST coordination
Established networks of local 
offices/members
Establishment of joint HLZs
Partnerships with The UPS Foundation, 
FedEx, Mountain Child, and Mission Aviation 
Fellowshipg
Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process
Public and civil affairs sections
Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF









Table 8 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the SOUTHCOM area of 
responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. In comparison to the MEU, SAWSO 
offers significant competencies in supply, deployment and distribution, health service and 
support, and collaboration and governance. SAWSO possesses resources to increase food 
and water purification capacity, and fills a supply capability gap for the MEU by 
providing access to shelter-related materials such as mosquito nets, cots, tarps, tents, and 
blankets. The mobile canteens SAWSO mobilized in SOUTHCOM to deliver food to 
affected areas offer an advantage in deployment and distribution, as does their 
partnership with The UPS Foundation. SAWSO fills another gap for the MEU with 
health service support competencies that extend beyond the capabilities of embedded 
corpsmen, to include conducting lab testing, basic surgery and childbirth support, and the 
provision of pharmaceutical drugs. SAWSO also demonstrated significant collaboration 
and governance competencies by managing IDP camps, working with local government 
and military for relief flight clearances, and coordinating cash-for-work construction 
programs. Collaborating with SAWSO affords the MEU an opportunity to plug into an 
accomplished coordination network. 
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Table 8.   MEU and SAWSO Core Competencies (SOUTHCOM). 
 
Data for MEU core competencies come from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014). a 
The Salvation Army, Australia (2010); b “Ten Millionth Meal” (2010);c GiveWell (2011); d “Salvation 
Army in Chile” (2014); e OMB (2010); f The Salvation Army World Service Office (2010). 
 
3. EUCOM 
Table 9 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the EUCOM area of 
responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. SAWSO demonstrates capabilities in the 
essential service areas of supply and collaboration and governance, which may improve the 
Essential Services & Capabilities for 
Disaster Response
MEU Core Competencies SAWSO Core Competencies (SOUTHCOM)
Unclassified & plain text communications Local SA offices
Public and civil affairs sections
Social media
Rotary wing imagery/mass distribution of informational 
materials
Creation of crisis action team
S2 Intelligence and S6 Communications sections
Initial HAST Assessment teamsa
Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments
Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population





Fuel, food Supply staging areas in south Floridaa
Manpower for sea and air port security
Food (pre-packaged meals in partnership 
with Numana, Inc.)b
Manpower and equipment for debris clearance Water purification systemsa
(2) tactical water purifiers Mosquito netsc
Military police detachment Cots, tarps, tents, and transitional shelters
Infantry battalion Blankets, mattressesd
(4) forklifts, (1) bulldozer, (1) excavator, (31) MTVR trucks, 
(105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs
Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel Partnership with The UPS Foundationa
(19) rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) 
HMMWVs, (15) AAVs, (4) forklifts Mobile canteens
d
Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID
Embedded Navy corpsmen Exams, lab testinge





Established networks of local 
offices/members
Establishment of joint HLZs
Coordination with government/military 
agencies for relief flight clearancesa
Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process
Lead agency for governing IDP camp of 
20,000 residentse
Public and civil affairs sections
Coordinated cash-for-work construction 
programf
Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF
Collaboration & Governance







MEU’s response or fill competency gaps. SAWSO offers food packages that fit specific 
categories of affected personnel, such as families, IDPs in transit, and families with infants. 
This level of distinction may meet demand more accurately than the MEU’s generic food 
supplies. SAWSO also offers temporary shelters and clothing, areas of supply where the 
MEU experiences a gap. Finally, SAWSO’s ability to provide medical and legal support 
for IDPs offers a degree of collaboration and governance that the MEU does not possess. 
Table 9.   MEU and SAWSO Core Competencies (EUCOM). 
 
Data for MEU core competencies come from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho 
(2014). a OMB (2014); b “Salvation Army Continues” (2016). 
Essential Services & Capabilities for 
Disaster Response
MEU Core Competencies SAWSO Core Competencies (EUCOM)
Unclassified & plain text communications Local SA offices
Public and civil affairs sections
Social media
Rotary wing imagery/mass distribution of informational 
materials
Creation of crisis action team
S2 Intelligence and S6 Communications sections
Initial HAST
Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments
Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population






Food packages for families, IDPs in transit, 
and families with infantsa
Manpower for sea and air port security Clothingb
Manpower and equipment for debris clearance Temporary shelterb
(2) tactical water purifiers
Military police detachment
Infantry battalion
(4) forklifts, (1) bulldozer, (1) excavator, (31) MTVR trucks, 
(105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs
Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel
(19) rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) 
HMMWVs, (15) AAVs, (4) forklifts
Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID
Embedded Navy corpsmen Hygiene kitsb
Medical supplies Basic medical careb
HAST coordination
Established networks of local 
offices/members
Establishment of joint HLZs Medical and legal support for IDPsb
Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process
Public and civil affairs sections
Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF
Collaboration & Governance








Table 10 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the AFRICOM area of 
responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. SAWSO offers additional capabilities in 
the service areas of supply and deployment and distribution. Like its capabilities in other 
regions, SAWSO’s ability to supply food and rainwater-harvesting tanks present useful 
increases in the MEU’s supply capacity. Clothing and blanket supplies also fill a gap for 
the MEU. In terms of distribution, SAWSO’s tractors may be used to pull water tanks or 
other supplies. The organization’s demonstrated ability to coordinate multi-phase 
distribution programs is also a useful coordinating element to aid the MEU in the most 
efficient and effective distribution of supplies. 
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Table 10.   MEU and SAWSO’s Core Competencies (AFRICOM). 
 
Data for MEU core competencies come from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014). 
a Ndeta (2011); b “The Salvation Army Is Responding” (2011); c OMB (2014). 
 
5. CENTCOM 
Table 11 compares SAWSO’s core competencies in the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility to the MEU’s core competencies. The supply and deployment and 
distribution service areas offer the greatest potential for SAWSO to complement the 
MEU’s disaster relief efforts. While the MEU provides food and water purification 
Essential Services & Capabilities for 
Disaster Response
MEU Core Competencies SAWSO Core Competencies (AFRICOM)
Unclassified & plain text communications Local SA offices
Public and civil affairs sections
Social media
Rotary wing imagery/mass distribution of informational 
materials
Creation of crisis action team
S2 Intelligence and S6 Communications sections
Initial HAST
Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments
Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population





Fuel, food Food (maize, canned food, etc)a
Manpower for sea and air port security Cooking oila
Manpower and equipment for debris clearance Rainwater-harvesting tanksb
(2) tactical water purifiers Mosquito netsc
Military police detachment Clothingc
Infantry battalion Blanketsc
(4) forklifts, (1) bulldozer, (1) excavator, (31) MTVR trucks, 
(105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs
Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel Tractors to pull water tanksb
(19) rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) 
HMMWVs, (15) AAVs, (4) forklifts
Delivery of water purifiers and supplies from USAID
Embedded Navy corpsmen Hygiene itemsc
Medical supplies
HAST coordination
Established networks of local 
offices/members
Establishment of joint HLZs
Organized multi-phase food distribution 
plana
Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process
Public and civil affairs sections
Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF
Collaboration & Governance







systems, it experiences a gap concerning shelter materials. SAWSO fills this gap by 
providing winterized shelters, tents, cooking utensils and plates, quilts, pillows, and 
mattresses in the CENTCOM AOR. SAWSO’s access to trucks also offers the possibility 
of increasing the MEU’s organic distribution capability, assuming roads are traversable in 
the affected region.  
Table 11.   MEU and SAWSO’s Core Competencies (CENTCOM). 
 
Data for MEU core competencies come from Gastrock and Iturriaga (2013) and Apte and Yoho (2014). 
a “Salvation Army Earthquake Relief” (2006); b The Salvation Army (n.d.). 
Essential Services & Capabilities for 
Disaster Response
MEU Core Competencies SAWSO Core Competencies (CENTCOM)
Unclassified & plain text communications Local SA offices
Public and civil affairs sections
Social media
Rotary wing imagery/mass distribution of informational 
materials
Creation of crisis action team
S2 Intelligence and S6 Communications sections
Initial HAST
Rotary wing aerial surveys/assessments
Troop contact and info-gathering with affected population





Fuel, food Tents, winterized sheltersa
Manpower for sea and air port security Family packs with rationsb
Manpower and equipment for debris clearance Plates, cooking utensilsa
(2) tactical water purifiers Blanketsa
Military police detachment Sewing machinesa
Infantry battalion Quilts, pillows, mattressesa
(4) forklifts, (1) bulldozer, (1) excavator, (31) MTVR trucks, 
(105) HMMWVs, (15) AAVs School supplies
a
Air and ground delivery of supplies and personnel
Trucks for SA team to drive over 100 km 
with suppliesb
(19) rotary-wing aircraft, (2) C-130s, (31) MTVR trucks, (105) 
HMMWVs, (15) AAVs, (4) forklifts




Established networks of local 
offices/members
Establishment of joint HLZs
Inclusion of HN and NGOs in planning process
Public and civil affairs sections
Exchange of embedded liaison teams with JSDF
Collaboration & Governance







D. CORE COMPETENCY CONCLUSIONS 
While SAWSO’s core competencies differ by region, overall it appears that 
supply, deployment and distribution, health service support, and collaboration and 
governance are the essential service areas where SAWSO can complement the MEU’s 
resources. In particular, SAWSO’s access to additional food, water storage/purification, 
and shelter supplies increase the MEU’s capacity and fill supply gaps. SAWSO’s 
partnerships with organizations such as The UPS Foundation offer an increase in 
distribution capacity, and its networks with other NGOs and local governments presents a 
powerful collaboration resource during disaster relief operations, and may aid in needs 
assessment as well. Finally, SAWSO’s health service capabilities fill a significant gap in 
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VIII. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
To accomplish its goals, an organization must have the financial means to execute 
them. An analysis of the SAWSO’s disaster response capabilities would be incomplete 
without examining its financial efficiency. This chapter begins with an overview of 
literature concerning how the Salvation Army viewed financial accountability during its 
initial development in England. Due to the difficulty of acquiring financial documents 
from this time period, this section serves as a useful examination of the organization’s 
early financial stance and character, rather than a numbers-based analysis.  
Subsequent sections use the methodology set forth by Nguyen and Curley (2013) 
to categorize annual revenue sources and expenses. Financial data was drawn from the 
IRS Form 990, and the OMB Circular A-133 Financial Report, an independently audited 
report produced by SAWSO. The analysis considers overall budget efficiency by 
calculating the ratio of annual revenue to expenditures, and uses criteria established by 
Charity Watch to consider overall mission efficiency. 
The final portion of this chapter offers an analysis of how SAWSO distributes 
grants and allocations regionally throughout the world. These figures are presented both 
by geographic region as defined by the IRS, and by geographic combatant command as 
defined by the DOD, to provide as complete a picture as possible of SAWSO’s 
worldwide activities. 
B. METHODOLOGY NOTES 
This report considers data from both the IRS Form 990 and OMB Circular A-133 
annual reports covering 2003 to 2015. Copies of the OMB Circular A-133 were not 
available prior to 2003. From 2003 to 2011, SAWSO reported its finances on a calendar 
year cycle for both the IRS Form 990 and OMB Circular A-133; during this period, the 
organization reported its financial data for the year beginning on 1 January and ending 31 
December. Beginning in 2011, SAWSO switched to reporting in accordance with the 
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fiscal year calendar. The 2011 reports cover financial activities from 1 January 2011 to 
30 Sept 2011. The 2012 report and subsequent reports up through 2015 cover the normal 
fiscal year calendar, October to September. 
Throughout this analysis, values from the IRS Form 990 were used to create the 
charts and graphs to remain consistent throughout the evaluation. These values were 
compared to those reported in the OMB Circular A-133, and any discrepancies were 
explained by the IRS Form 990 Schedule D, which reconciles differences in revenue and 
expenses between Form 990 and the OMB Circular A-133. Additionally, the differences 
between the reports did not produce different results in terms of this report’s financial 
analysis. Rather, the similarities between the two documents provided a level of 
redundancy that lends itself to increased accuracy. The source data for figures presented 
in this section is located in Appendix A and was compiled using the IRS Form 990. 
C. EARLY FINANCIAL BACKGROUND 
As described in Chapter I, the Salvation Army originated as a “break-away group 
with no money, no established power base, and no property” (Irvine, 2002, p. 10). Its 
early ambitions focused on delivering spiritual salvation to the cast-aside sects of British 
society, and it eventually emerged as an independent religious organization. However, the 
Salvation Army lacked the established sources of funding and property enjoyed by other 
major churches at the time. Irvine (2002) notes that churches must be particularly 
cognizant of society’s expectations for financial accountability when they rely on the 
public to fund their operations, as was the case for the early Salvation Army. When 
William Booth published In Darkest England and the Way Out, he proclaimed a very 
public call to action and solicitation of funds from British citizens. Critics alleged that 
Booth was embezzling funds for himself, and called into question the Salvation Army’s 
early financial practices (Irvine, 2002). The resulting inquiry vindicated the Army’s fiscal 
accountability procedures.   
This public scrutiny, and the need to establish the young Salvation Army as a 
legitimate and reputable organization, reinforced the Army’s practice of providing 
audited financial statements to improve its image. Starting in 1868, when it was still 
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known as the Christian Mission, the organization published annual, publicly audited 
balance sheets, and this requirement continued after it became known as the Salvation 
Army in 1880 (Bale, 1990). These balance sheets were generally included in The 
Christian Mission Magazine and its subsequent rebranding as The War Cry. Booth made 
a point of having the balance sheets audited by firms of chartered accountants, such as 
Josiah Beddow & Sons and Knox, Burbridge, Cropper, and Co., to legitimize the Army’s 
operations and promote transparency (Irvine, 2002).   
Additionally, Booth established Army regulations that required at least two 
persons to be involved in any monetary matters, including counting collections for 
various efforts and verifying receipts for purchases or expenditures (Sandall, 1950). 
Further detail and guidance on internal control procedures were promulgated by Booth in 
“The Orders and Regulations for Treasurers and Secretaries” (Howson, 2005). These 
records indicate a firm understanding of The Salvation Army’s dependency on public 
support and the need to present a reliable image in order to survive. 
Despite this early focus on accountability and transparency, the Salvation Army 
found itself involved in a financial scandal in 1993. During this time, the Army was 
unable to account for £6.34 million for nearly two months, until an investigation 
uncovered fraud perpetrated by two of its officers (Howson, 2005). Howson (2005) 
speculates that the emphasis of trust and lack of supervision in non-profit organizations 
may increase the likelihood of fraudulent activities. However, aside from the 1993 
scandal in England, the Salvation Army has received accolades for its efficient use of 
funds. The 2006 USA National Annual Report pointed out that 83 cents of every dollar 
went directly to program services (Gariepy, 2009), and Ebeling and Lee’s 1998 Forbes 
article heaped praise on the Army’s handling of costs versus returns on expenditures. The 
following sections examine the Salvation Army’s financial documents to delve further 
into how efficiently the Army uses its funds. 
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D. REVENUE AND EXPENSE OVERVIEW 
1. Revenue Sources 
Using the methodology set forth by Nguyen and Curley (2013), revenue sources 
are divided into the following categories: contributions, grants, investments, and other 
revenue. Contributions consist of cash and dollar value of in-kind goods and services 
from federated campaigns, membership dues, fundraising events, related organizations, 
and other contribution sources. Grants include revenue from government sources. 
Investment revenue includes dividends and interest, and other revenue incorporates 
revenue streams that do not fit in either of the other three categories. For SAWSO, the 
other revenue category exclusively consists of gains or losses from the sale of assets other 
than inventory. Figure 9 presents the results of this categorization with the cumulative 
distribution of revenue sources between 2003 and 2015. Contributions make up the 
overwhelming majority of SAWSO’s revenue at 86%. This is unsurprising, given that 
SAWSO’s status as a religious organization and history of relying on public 
contributions. Its tendency to evangelize while delivering services results in an inability 
to accept government funding for many projects, hence the relatively small percentage of 
revenue that results from government grants. 
 
Figure 9.  SAWSO Cumulative Revenue Sources 2003–2015. Adapted from 
Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
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Figure 10 depicts the changes in total contributions received from 2003 to 2015. During 
this time period, the greatest number of contributions was received in 2010, and the least 
in 2003. The fact that SAWSO relies heavily on contributions for its revenue stream may 
indicate a higher sensitivity to economic conditions and shifts that may influence the 
population’s donation habits. Any scandals or poor press about SAWSO in particular, or 
the Salvation Army in general, may also have a disproportionate effect on the 
organization due to its reliance on public support. 
 
 
Figure 10.  SAWSO Annual Contribution Revenue, 2003–2015. Adapted from 
Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
Given SAWSO’s reliance on contributions, Figure 11 offers a closer look at the 
sources of those contributions and reveals that, between 2008 and 2015, 83% of 
SAWSO’s contributions came from related organizations. Per the IRS Form 990 
Schedule R for those years, related organizations consist of the Salvation Army USA’s 
regional territories (South, West, Central, and East), along with the Salvation Army IHQ 
and Salvation Army National Corporation. This is to be expected, as SAWSO is the 
international arm of the Salvation Army in the United States, and receives contributions 
from the territories to fund its overseas mission.  
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Figure 11.  SAWSO Contribution Sources, 2008–2015. Adapted from 
Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
According to data compiled from the Salvation Army USA’s annual reports 
between 2015 and 2008, 25% of their revenue flows from contributions, and 18% from 
contributions for split-interest agreements, with a combined 43% of revenue coming from 
some type of contribution (The Salvation Army, 2016). This supports the observation that 
SAWSO is potentially vulnerable to shifting trends in contributions, whether they come 
directly to SAWSO or through the U.S. territories. 
2. Overall Budget Efficiency 
In general, the overall budget efficiency of a nonprofit organization can be 
determined by examining the ratio of total revenue to expenses. While a nonprofit 
organization operates similarly to a for-profit organization, it seeks to use those profits to 
further its program services rather than enriching shareholders. Given this rationale, the 
ratio of revenues to expenses should be nearly even over time. This assumption holds true 
for SAWSO, as depicted in Figure 12, which compares SAWSO’s cumulative revenue 
and expenses from 2003 to 2015.  
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Figure 12.  SAWSO’s Cumulative Revenue and Expenses 2003–2015. 
Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
While revenue and expenses are not an exact 50/50 split, they are relatively close 
and indicate positive overall budget efficiency. Figure 13 demonstrates how yearly 
fluctuations may affect the ratio calculation, but over time the flow of revenue and 
expenses comes close to equalizing. During this time period, average revenues were 
$26,325,926, and average expenses were $22,766,821. 
 
 
Figure 13.  SAWSO’s Annual Revenue versus Expenses. Adapted from 
Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
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The spike in revenue in 2010 is tied to an increase in contributions. Although it is 
difficult to explain the spike based on available information, a possible explanation for 
this increase is the Haiti earthquake that occurred in January 2010. Society’s desire to aid 
following the disaster and SAWSO’s involvement in disaster relief may have led to an 
increase in the amount of public contributions SAWSO received. Similarly, the spike in 
revenue in 2005 may be related to contributions in support of aid for the Indian Ocean 
earthquake and tsunami that occurred in December 2004. While Hurricane Katrina also 
occurred in 2005, SAWSO does not fund program services within the United States. 
E. MISSION EFFICIENCY 
1. Mission and Program Services 
While comparing the ratio of revenues and expenses is useful to provide a general 
idea of budget efficiency, a more pressing concern is how much of a nonprofit’s revenue 
actually goes toward accomplishing the organization’s stated mission. SAWSO’s 
mission, as stated in the 2015 IRS Form 990 and OMB Circular A-133 Financial Report, 
is displayed Table 12.  
Table 12.   SAWSO Mission per Financial Documents. 
 
 
To achieve this end, SAWSO channels its efforts into a number of program 
services. From 2003 to 2011, SAWSO identified four program services in its financial 
documents: health programs, community development, micro enterprise, and relief and 
reconstruction services. From 2011 to 2017, SAWSO combined community development 
and micro enterprise into a single program service: livelihood and anti-human trafficking. 
Source
Department of the 
Treasury (n.d.).
The Salvation Army 
World Service Office 
(2015a)
"Provide technical assistance and project funding to the International Salvation Army in diverse 
areas of economic development around the world."
Mission/Purpose
"To support and strengthen The Salvation Army's efforts to work hand in hand with communities to 
improve the health, economic, and spiritual conditions of the poor throughout the world."
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Table 13 lists SAWSO’s program services as of 2015, along with a description of each 
service as described in the OMB Circular A-133 Financial Report. 




2. Mission Efficiency 
To determine mission efficiency, this report uses the standard established by 
CharityWatch, a charity watchdog originally known as the American Institute of 
Philanthropy. According to CharityWatch (2016), expenses fall into two categories: 
program service expenses, and support programs, which include management, 
fundraising, and general overhead expenses. If an organization spends 75% or more of its 
expenses on program services, it is considered highly efficient. CharityWatch also 
considers fundraising efficiency by dividing fundraising expenses by related 
contributions to determine how much is being spent to obtain contributions. However, 
given the difficulty of determining which SAWSO contributions were related to 
fundraising efforts, this report focuses solely on mission efficiency. 
Using this metric, an analysis reveals that SAWSO is a highly efficient 
organization. Between 2003 and 2015, the lowest percentage spent on program services 
was 93.67% in 2013, with an average of over 96% mission efficiency. Figure 14 provides 
Program Service
Relief & Reconstruction 
Services
Health Services
Livelihood & Anti-Human 
Trafficking
Description
"Provide material assistance (food, clothing, and medical care) in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster. This program also promotes and supports longer-term assistance such as housing 
reconstruction and income generation for those affected by disasters" (SAWSO, 2012). It includes 
assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
"Designed to help end poverty and improve quality of life . . .  Serves the poor and vulnerable by 
initiating programs that increase access to community-based services and enhance health service 
quality at Salvation Army hospitals and clinics. Program focus areas are: maternal, child, and 
adolescent health; HIV care and prevention; non-communicable diseases; and community health 
and health facilities" (SAWSO, 2015a). 
"Seeks to improve economic conditions of families through economic, spiritual, and social support 
of individuals and their families, by helping them acquire the skills and assets needed to be free from 
oppressive labor, recover from setbacks, and create a better future for the next generation" 
(SAWSO, 2015a). 
 82 
a visual depiction of what percentage program service and supporting expenses 
contribute to SAWSO’s overall annual expenses. 
 
 
Figure 14.  SAWSO Annual Mission Efficiency. Adapted from Department of 
the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
This level of efficiency indicates that SAWSO is putting contributions to their 
intended use as often as possible, as opposed to contributing to overhead and supporting 
expenses. Given the focus of this report on disaster relief, further analysis indicated that 
disaster relief made up the overwhelming majority of program service expenses. Figure 
15 depicts this relationship, with relief and reconstruction efforts representing an average 
of 88% of SAWSO’s program service expenses. This conclusion supports the assertion 
that SAWSO is an important player to consider in relief and reconstruction efforts. 
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Figure 15.  Composition of  SAWSO’s Annual Program Service Expenses. 
Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
F. REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
1. Data Selection 
This section analyzes SAWSO’s disaster relief expenditures by region, in order to 
illustrate how the organization’s disaster relief funds are distributed throughout the world. 
To accomplish this, the report uses information collected from SAWSO’s IRS 990 Forms 
between 2008 and 2015. Although regional-level financial data is available between 2003 
and 2015, the regional expenditures from the 2005, 2006, and 2007 Form 990s are not 
categorized by program service. Initial analysis efforts included the full date range, from 
2003 to 2015, and resulted in abnormal spikes in spending, particularly in 2007, when the 
sub-Saharan African region experienced a noticeable increase in program service-related 
expenditures. Attempts to correlate documented disaster occurrences with this regional 
increase in spending were unsuccessful. This indicates that expenditures for other 
program services, such as health programs, altered the data from 2005 to 2007. Since the 
expenditures are not divided by program service, it is difficult to discern how funds were 
distributed during that time. Thus, to provide an accurate analysis of regional disaster 
relief and reconstruction spending, the regional analysis examines financial data between 
2008 and 2015. 
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2. Data Categorization 
 The IRS Form 990, Schedule F, presents overseas expenditures and investments 
according to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) classification of geographic regions. 
The regions relevant to this report include North America, South America, Central 
America and the Caribbean, Europe, Russia and neighboring states, sub-Saharan Africa, 
South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East (IRS, 2016b).  
In addition to presenting expenditures and investments by the IRS’s geographic 
regions, this report also categorizes them by the geographic combatant commands 
(COCOMs) used by the DOD. Figure 16 is a map of these COCOMs.  
 
 
Figure 16.  Map of U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands. Source: U.S. 
Department of Defense (2016). 
In general, the COCOMs correlate to the IRS’s geographic regions as described in 
Table 14. 
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Table 14.   Correlation between IRS Geographic Regions and U.S. COCOMs. 
 
 
While the Salvation Army International, and by extension SAWSO, divides the 
world into five geographic zones, this report judges that presenting expenditure 
information by IRS-designated regions and COCOMs meets the needs of the intended 
audience without including a third regional classification system. 
3. Expenditures by Region 
Figure 17 presents the cumulative distribution of SAWSO’s relief and 
reconstruction investments and expenditures between 2008 and 2015. Sub-Saharan Africa 
receives the most money of any region, at 21.92%. Europe follows with 19.16%, and 
South Asia comes in third at 17.44%.  




Central America & the Caribbean USSOUTHCOM
Europe USEUCOM
Russia & Neighboring States USEUCOM
South Asia USPACOM
Middle East USCENTCOM
East Asia & the Pacific USPACOM
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Figure 17.  SAWSO Cumulative Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and 
Investments by IRS Region, 2008–2015. Adapted from 
Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
Figure 18 presents similar cumulative information from 2008 to 2015, but 
categorizes it by COCOM. This categorization combines the IRS’s geographic regions of 
South Asia and East Asia and the Pacific into PACOM, which has the second largest 
cumulative expenditures at 23.82%. Representative disasters that may explain high 
expenditures in PACOM include the 2008 Myanmar cyclone, the 2011 Japan earthquake 
and tsunami, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. EUCOM garners the largest expenditures for 
relief and reconstruction efforts at 24.43%. While the PACOM region is typically 
associated with natural disasters, the fact that SAWSO includes refugee aid under relief 
and reconstruction services may partially explain why EUCOM received the largest 
cumulative expenditures between 2008 and 2015, given the influx of refugees seeking to 
escape conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and other war-stricken countries.  
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Figure 18.  SAWSO Cumulative Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and 
Investments by U.S. COCOM, 2008–2015. Adapted from 
Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
Figures 19 and 20 provide a year-by-year view of SAWSO’s relief and 
reconstruction expenditures by IRS region and COCOM, respectively. Both figures show 
a noticeable expenditure increase in 2010 for Central America and the Caribbean, which 
falls under SOUTHCOM. This corresponds to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010.  
 
 
Figure 19.  SAWSO Annual Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and 
Investments by IRS Region, 2008–2015. Adapted from 
Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
 88 
 
Figure 20.  SAWSO Annual Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and 
Investments by U.S. COCOM, 2008–2015. Adapted from 
Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
In order to provide context for these expenditures and offer an explanation for the 
trends depicted in Figures 19 and 20, this report used the EM-DAT International Disaster 
Database. The EM-DAT International Disaster Database offers the capability to produce 
a variety of graphs and charts based on input variables such as type of disaster, number of 
deaths, and region (Guha-Sapir, Below, & Hoyois, 2016). Figure 21 is one such graph, 




Figure 21.  Annual Deaths Caused by Natural Disasters, by Continent, 2008–
2015. Source: Guha-Sapir et al. (2016). 
When SAWSO’s regional expenditures for relief and reconstruction are re-
categorized to roughly match EM-DAT’s continent categorization, their financial trends 
roughly match the disaster-related fatality trends from Figure 21. Figure 22 depicts these 
expenditures re-categorized by continent.  
 
 
Figure 22.  SAWSO Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures by Continent, 
2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
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Both graphs show a spike in their respective measurements for the Americas in 
2010, indicating the influence of the Haiti earthquake. That same year, according to EM-
DAT, 55,736 people died in Russia as the result of an extreme temperature heat wave 
(Guha-Sapir et al., 2016). SAWSO’s financial data indicates little change in support as a 
result of that heat wave. When comparing Figures 21 and 22, it is important to note that 
disaster relief expenditures that do not generally involve fatalities, such as refugee or IDP 
aid, will not be reflected in EM-DAT’s information. Comparing these disaster-related 
deaths and relief and reconstruction funding is not a perfect apples-to-apples comparison, 
but the level of similarity in general trends between the two aids in providing context and 
validity for SAWSO’s expenditures.  
G. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS 
Financial analysis of SAWSO yields several important conclusions. First, its 
humble origins led to a heavy reliance on public contributions, which continues through 
2015. Other organizations who work with SAWSO in disaster relief operations should be 
aware that this dependency on contributions for revenue may make SAWSO more 
vulnerable to shifts in public opinion and economic conditions. Additionally, while the 
Salvation Army internalized fiscal accountability and transparency during its early years, 
partners should keep in mind that no organization, despite its charitable purpose, may 
claim complete immunity from individual acts of fraud by its employees.   
Regarding overall budget efficiency and mission efficiency, SAWSO performs 
extremely well, falling within CharityWatch’s program versus supporting expense 
guidelines as a highly efficient organization. Of particular note for other organizations 
involved in disaster relief, the majority of SAWSO’s program service funding goes 
toward disaster relief and reconstruction. This provides a solid foundation for SAWSO’s 
disaster-related operational capabilities. 
Finally, U.S. Combatant Commanders may find it useful to note that SAWSO’s 
regional disaster relief expenditures tend to track with global disaster occurrences. Based 
on expenditures, entities involved in EUCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM may experience 
a higher likelihood of encountering SAWSO during relief efforts. However, since refugee 
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and IDP aid falls under SAWSO’s relief and reconstruction program service, adjacent 
organizations should be aware that a high-volume refugee crisis may decrease funding for 
rapid-onset natural disasters elsewhere.  
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A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Chapter IV’s historical analysis of the Salvation Army illuminates an organization 
with a firm foundation in evangelical Christian beliefs and a hierarchical structure that 
continue to guide its overarching mission today. However, the Salvation Army’s history, 
particularly its history in the United States, demonstrates that it is capable of adapting its 
methods to maintain a connection to the changing face of society by emphasizing 
program services and spreading their faith by example, rather than relying on street 
corner sermons.  
Chapter VI found that SAWSO’s disaster relief capabilities vary by region. In 
PACOM, SAWSO met 36% of the Sphere Project’s minimum standards in WASH, and 
80% of the minimum standards in shelter, settlement, and non-food items. While the 
organization scored relatively low on standards for other Sphere Project performance 
measures, it demonstrated competence in general food security and livelihoods, and the 
provision of essential health services and injury care. In SOUTHCOM, SAWSO also 
demonstrated competence in shelter, settlement, and non-food items, and earned the 
highest score among the COCOMs for health action. Evidence for this category derived 
largely from its relief operations following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In EUCOM and 
CENTCOM, SAWSO met at least half the minimum standards in shelter, settlement, and 
non-food items.  In AFRICOM, SAWSO failed to demonstrate enough capability to 
demonstrate proficiency in any of the four major categories, although it did provide 
general food security and drinking water for affected populations.   
Chapter VII’s comparison of SAWSO and a MEU’s disaster relief core 
competencies revealed that, in general, supply, deployment and distribution, health 
service support, and collaboration and governance are the most significant services that 
SAWSO contributes to relief activities. SAWSO’s access to food and ability to distribute 
water and shelter items expand the MEU’s organic capabilities in those areas. 
Additionally, SAWSO’s basic health service competencies fill a gap in the MEU’s 
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existing resources. MEU commanders and other involved agencies should also take note 
of SAWSO’s partnerships with organizations such as The UPS Foundation, which can 
improve distribution. Finally, the Salvation Army’s international presence and local 
offices around the world presents a significant resource for coordinating with host nation 
entities and conducting needs assessment with personnel familiar with the affected area, 
culture, and population.  
Finally, Chapter VIII confirmed that SAWSO is a highly efficient organization 
with regard to overall budget and program services, with a majority of program service 
funding dedicated to disaster relief and reconstruction. Most of the organization’s funding 
comes from public contributions. SAWSO demonstrates a pattern of matching regional 
expenditures with the frequency and magnitude of disasters occurring in each geographic 
area. This indicates a level of flexibility to shift financial resources where they are needed 
rapidly in response to disaster events. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The fact that spreading spiritual salvation remains the Salvation Army’s primary 
goal may lead to conflict when dealing with populations or agencies that are not 
favorably inclined toward Christian evangelism. Potential partner agencies must also 
consider the Salvation Army’s centralized, hierarchical structure to ensure they 
understand who in the chain of command possesses the necessary authority to accomplish 
coordinating activities. 
The implications of the operational capability analysis and MEU core competency 
comparison offer a foundation for the military and other humanitarian agencies to 
coordinate resource management during disaster relief efforts. The capability score card 
serves as a foundation for inter-agency collaboration. However, the results of this 
analysis should always be supplemented with active coordination efforts to confirm 
current resource availability. In particular, the data for CENTCOM and AFRICOM 
derives from a low number of disaster events, and SAWSO’s actual capabilities in those 
regions may extend beyond those determined using the conservative methods of this 
study. In EUCOM, the Salvation Army maintains a strong presence with well-funded 
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local offices in Europe, and this may result in a lower number of requests for assistance 
from SAWSO. Additionally, SAWSO’s inclusion of refugee and IDP assistance activities 
under its relief and reconstruction program service may result in less resource availability 
for rapid-onset disasters if a high-volume refugee crisis is in progress at the same time. 
SAWSO’s financial analysis reveals that it relies heavily on public contributions. 
This is relevant for potential partners, as SAWSO’s financial resources may be 
vulnerable to shifts in public opinion and economic conditions. Overall however, 
SAWSO’s high levels of budget efficiency and spending on relief and reconstruction 
activities (relative to spending on its other program services) indicates that it is likely to 
serve as a reliable partner with regard to fiscal responsibility and resources for disaster 
response operations. Overall, SAWSO represents a significant asset and valuable partner 
for the military and other humanitarian agencies to coordinate with in order to increase 
the efficacy and efficiency of disaster response efforts.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Due to resource limitations, this study focuses on SAWSO’s capabilities, but the 
Salvation Army is an international organization with a presence in 127 countries. A case 
study focusing on the local offices in each region would provide a more well-rounded and 
nuanced awareness of the Salvation Army’s full range of disaster relief capabilities. 
Additionally, it is recommended that further research pursue similar case studies of other 
major government and non-government organizations involved in disaster relief 
activities, to build the base of knowledge and facilitate cross-agency collaboration.  
The original intent of this report involved a comprehensive report of the Salvation 
Army International, rather than focusing on SAWSO. However, it became apparent that 
attempting to collect data from more than 40 regional offices extended beyond available 
time and resources. An attempt to contact each of these offices met with a less than 5% 
response rate. Additionally, the original scope presented significant issues for conducting 
the financial analysis, given that the Salvation Army’s regional offices adhere to the 
reporting regulations of their host nations, which may or may not involve easily 
accessible reports as is the case with SAWSO and its publicly-available annual 
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documentation for the IRS. Future research is recommended to develop a more complete 
picture of the Salvation Army’s international presence and capabilities. 
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APPENDIX A. SPHERE PROJECT MINIMUM STANDARDS 
This appendix presents the Sphere Project minimum standards for WASH, food 
security and nutrition, shelter, settlement, and non-food items, and health action, as 
detailed in the Sphere Project (2011) Handbook. 
A. MINIMUM STANDARDS IN WATER SUPPLY, SANITATION, AND 
HYGIENE PROMOTION 
This section describes the minimum standards identified by the Sphere Handbook 
for the various sections that fall under the WASH category. The intent of WASH 
standards is to describe the basic right of all humans to access clean water and sanitation 
(The Sphere Project, 2011). 
1. Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Promotion (WASH) 
The WASH standard described in Figure 23 addresses the promotion of “good 
personal and environmental hygiene in order to protect health” (The Sphere Project, 
2011, p. 88). 
 
Figure 23.   WASH Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
2. Hygiene Promotion 
The Sphere Project defines hygiene promotion as “a planned, systematic approach 
to enable people to take action to prevent and/or mitigate water, sanitation, and hygiene-




Figure 24.  Hygiene Promotion Standard One. Source: 
The Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 25.  Hygiene Promotion Standard Two. Source: 
The Sphere Project (2011). 
3. Water Supply 
Figures 26, 27, and 28 describe the minimum standards for water supply to 
maintain basic levels of health and dignity (The Sphere Project, 2011). 
 
Figure 26.  Water Supply Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
 99 
 
Figure 27.  Water Supply Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 28.  Water Supply Standard Three. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
4. Excreta Disposal 
Human waste presents a significant health risk and may lead to a number of 
diseases. Figures 29 and 30 present the minimum standards to address this issue (The 
Sphere Project, 2011). 
 
Figure 29.  Excrete Disposal Standard One. Source: 
The Sphere Project (2011). 
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Figure 30.  Excreta Disposal Standard Two. Source: 
The Sphere Project (2011). 
5. Vector Control 
Per the Sphere Project, “a vector is a disease-carrying agent and vector-borne 
diseases are a major cause of sickness and death in many disaster situations” (2011, p. 
111). Figures 31, 32, and 33 address the minimum standards to control and mitigate the 
impact of vectors in a disaster response scenario. 
 
Figure 31.  Vector Control Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 32.  Vector Control Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
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Figure 33.  Vector Control Standard Three. Source: The Sphere Project 
(2011). 
6. Solid Waste Management 
Similar to excreta disposal, solid waste management addresses “the process of 
handling and disposal of organic and hazardous solid waste which, if unattended 
appropriately, can pose public health risks” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 117). Figure 34 
describes the minimum standard for this area. 
 
Figure 34.  Solid Waste Management Standard One. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
7. Drainage 
Standing water presents a health risk to the surrounding population. Figure 35 
describes the minimum standard required to protect against this risk. 
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Figure 35.  Drainage Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
B. MINIMUM STANDARDS IN FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION 
The Sphere Project’s minimum standards for food security and nutrition address 
the right for each person to have enough food to “be free from hunger” (The Sphere 
Project, 2011, p. 143). 
1. Food Security and Nutrition Assessment 
Throughout disaster response operations, responders must conduct on-going 
assessments of the affected population to determine their needs. Food security and 
nutrition assessments are particularly important to maintain awareness of threats to 
proper nutrition (The Sphere Project, 2011). Figures 36 and 37 present the standards 
associated with food security and nutrition assessments. 
 
Figure 36.  Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Standard One. Source: 
The Sphere Project (2011). 
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Figure 37.  Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Standard Two. Source: 
The Sphere Project (2011). 
2. Infant and Young Child Feeding 
Young children and infants are particularly vulnerable during disasters, as they 
generally have specific nutrition needs. In particular, “breastfeeding protection and 
support” or some alternative formula source is crucial for infants (The Sphere Project, 
2011, p. 158). Figures 38 and 39 present the minimum standards for this area. 
 
Figure 38.  Infant and Young Child Feeding Standard One. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 39.  Infant and Young Child Feeding Standard Two. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
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3. Management of Acute Malnutrition and Micronutrient Deficiencies 
Acute malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies carry a high threat of mortality. 
Methods to address these issues include supplementary feeding, therapeutic care, and 
community-based management (The Sphere Project, 2011). Figures 40, 41, and 42 
present the standards for addressing these problems. 
 
Figure 40.  Management of Acute Malnutrition Standard One. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 41.  Management of Acute Malnutrition Standard Two. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 42.  Management of Acute Malnutrition Standard Three. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
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4. Food Security: General 
In general, “food security responses should aim to meet short-term needs” and 
avoid introducing coping strategies that may be unsustainable or cause long-term harm to 
the affected population (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 175). Figure 43 describes the 
standard for general food security. 
 
Figure 43.  Food Security General Standard One. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
5. Food Security: Food Transfers 
Food transfers involve ensuring secure access to “food of adequate quality and 
quantity,” with “the means to prepare and consume it safely” (The Sphere Project, 2011, 
p. 179). Figures 44 through 49 present the minimum standards for food transfers. 
 




Figure 45.  Food Security—Food Transfers Standard Two. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
 
Figure 46.  Food Security—Food Transfers Standard Three. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 47.  Food Security—Food Transfers Standard Four. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
 




Figure 49.  Food Security—Food Transfers Standard Six. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
6. Food Security: Cash and Voucher Transfers 
Unlike food transfers, cash and voucher transfers entail using cash or coupons to 
purchase food items. In general, these methods use “a market-based approach where 
beneficiaries are provided with purchasing power” (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 199). 
Figure 50 details the standard for cash and voucher transfers related to food security. 
 
Figure 50.  Food Security Cash and Voucher Transfers Standard One. Source: 
The Sphere Project (2011). 
7. Food Security: Livelihoods 
Protecting the economic livelihood of those affected by the disaster lowers their 
risk of suffering from food insecurity and encourages sustainable recovery. Figures 51, 
52, and 53 describe the minimum standards for food security as it pertains to the 
livelihoods of the affected population. 
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Figure 51.  Food Security—Livelihoods Standard One. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
 
Figure 52.  Food Security—Livelihoods Standard Two. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
 
Figure 53.  Food Security—Livelihoods Standard Three. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
C. MINIMUM STANDARDS IN SHELTER, SETTLEMENTS, AND NON-
FOOD ITEMS 
The Sphere Project (2011) asserts that all humans have the right to viable shelter, 
and uses minimum standards in shelter, settlements, and non-food items to describe the 
requirements involved in protecting this right.  
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1. Shelter and Settlement 
Access to adequate shelter is a crucial factor for the survival of disaster-affected 
populations. The Sphere Project (2011) advises that, when possible, temporary or 
transitional shelters should be located near the original homes, although IDP camps may 
be established when this is not an option (The Sphere Project, 2011). Figures 54 through 
58 describe the minimum standards concerning shelter and settlement. 
 
Figure 54.  Shelter and Settlement Standard One. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
 
Figure 55.  Shelter and Settlement Standard Two. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
 




Figure 57.  Shelter and Settlement Standard Four. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
 
Figure 58.  Shelter and Settlement Standard Five. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
2. Non-food Items: Clothing, Bedding and Household Items 
In addition to shelter, non-food items assist in keeping the affected population 
protected from the elements and meeting basic human needs. Figures 59 through 63 
describe the standards to ensue these needs are met. 
 
Figure 59.  Non-food Items Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
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Figure 60.  Non-Food Items Standard Two. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
 
Figure 61.  Non-food Items Standard Three. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
 
Figure 62.  Non-food Items Standard Four. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 63.  Non-food Items Standard Five. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
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D. MINIMUM STANDARDS IN HEALTH ACTION 
This section describes the Sphere Project’s minimum standards that express the 
affected population’s right to health (2011).  
1. Health Systems 
Health systems involve the integration and coordination of all organizations 
dedicated to health actions (The Sphere Project, 2011). Figures 64 through 69 provide 
detail on the standards involved with ensuring health systems are both efficient and 
effective in their delivery of services. 
 
Figure 64.  Health Systems Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 65.  Health Systems Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
 




Figure 67.  Health Systems Standard Four. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 68.  Health Systems Standard Five. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 69.  Health Systems Standard Six. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
2. Essential Health Services 
Essential health services involve both “preventative and curative health services” 
delivered to affected populations following a disaster (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 309). 
Figure 70 describes the basic standard for prioritizing these services. 
 
Figure 70.  Essential Health Services Standard One. Source: The Sphere 
Project (2011). 
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3. Control of Communicable Diseases 
In the aftermath of a disaster, poor living conditions and difficulty accessing 
hygiene-related resources may lead to the rapid spread of communicable diseases such as 
measles, malaria, and diarrhea. Figures 71, 72, and 73 present The Sphere Project’s 
standards for controlling the spread of these diseases. 
 
Figure 71.  Control of Communicable Diseases Standard One. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 72.  Control of Communicable Diseases Standard Two. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 73.  Control of Communicable Diseases Standard Three. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
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4. Child Health 
Children are among the particularly vulnerable population following a disaster, 
and may require specific health actions. Figures 75 and 75 describe the standards that 
should guide the delivery of children’s’ health services. 
 
Figure 74.  Child Health Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 75.  Child Health Standard Two. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
5. Sexual and Reproductive Health 
Reproductive health, particularly in areas that may have a high occurrence of 
sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS, is an area of health action that response 
organizations must consider. Figures 76 and 77 present standards to address these areas. 
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Figure 76.  Sexual and Reproductive Health Standard One. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
 
Figure 77.  Sexual and Reproductive Health Standard Two. Source: The 
Sphere Project (2011). 
6. Injury 
According to the Sphere Project, “injury is usually the major cause of excess 
mortality and morbidity following acute-onset natural disasters” (2011, p. 331). Figure 78 
describes the minimum standard response agencies should meet concerning injuries. 
 
Figure 78.  Injury Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
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7. Mental Health 
Along with physical ailments, the trauma associated with disasters may lead to 
psychological problems in the affected population. Figure 79 highlights the need to 
address mental health during recovery efforts. 
 
Figure 79.  Mental Health Standard One. Source: The Sphere Project (2011). 
8. Non-communicable Diseases 
Non-communicable diseases may involve issues such as “existing chronic 
conditions”, and may be more common in areas with an older population (The Sphere 
Project, 2011, p. 336). Figure 80 addresses the minimum standard to confront these 
diseases. 
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APPENDIX B. FINANCIAL DATA. 
This appendix presents the data used to create the figures and graphs presented in Chapter V: Financial Analysis. The data is 
compiled from SAWSO’s IRS Form 990s between 2003 through 2015. The data is presented in tables in the order in which figures 
appear in the chapter. 
Table 15.   Data for Figure 9, SAWSO Cumulative Revenue Sources, and Figure 10, SAWSO Annual Contribution 
Revenue. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
 
Year Contributions Grants Investments Other Total
2003 9,366,623$                                         2,591,559$                                           122,146$                                 (206,206)$                             11,874,122$              
2004 10,103,767$                                      1,830,001$                                           128,685$                                 117,143$                              12,179,596$              
2005 38,517,505$                                      1,952,139$                                           782,760$                                 129,090$                              41,381,494$              
2006 20,783,331$                                      2,655,645$                                           670,189$                                 291,757$                              24,400,922$              
2007 30,179,538$                                      3,081,857$                                           794,109$                                 2,066,067$                           36,121,571$              
2008 26,862,727$                                      4,050,363$                                           912,498$                                 (724,131)$                             31,101,457$              
2009 19,745,934$                                      3,990,361$                                           673,575$                                 (2,797,569)$                          21,612,301$              
2010 49,102,347$                                      1,871,566$                                           687,668$                                 271,483$                              51,933,064$              
2011 22,320,737$                                      1,372,622$                                           464,136$                                 599,620$                              24,757,115$              
2012 17,561,436$                                      1,577,173$                                           842,647$                                 2,626,506$                           22,607,762$              
2013 12,796,646$                                      1,074,794$                                           945,104$                                 1,966,811$                           16,783,355$              
2014 21,314,943$                                      230,534$                                              896,960$                                 3,276,082$                           25,718,519$              
2015 16,954,525$                                      342,239$                                              1,018,301$                              3,450,694$                           21,765,759$              
Totals 295,610,059$                                    26,620,853$                                        8,938,778$                              11,067,347$                         342,237,037$           
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Table 16.   Data for Figure 12, SAWSO’s Cumulative Revenue and Expenses 2003–2015, and Figure 13, SAWSO’s 
Annual Revenue versus Expenses. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
 
Year Total Revenue Total Expenses % Revenue % Expense
2003 11,874,122$                                      12,668,933$                                        48.38% 51.62%
2004 12,179,596$                                      12,746,762$                                        48.86% 51.14%
2005 41,381,494$                                      18,642,888$                                        68.94% 31.06%
2006 24,400,922$                                      24,374,823$                                        50.03% 49.97%
2007 36,121,571$                                      37,149,725$                                        49.30% 50.70%
2008 31,101,457$                                      35,880,939$                                        46.43% 53.57%
2009 21,612,301$                                      24,309,300$                                        47.06% 52.94%
2010 51,933,064$                                      32,515,814$                                        61.50% 38.50%
2011 24,757,115$                                      16,590,159$                                        59.88% 40.12%
2012 22,607,762$                                      22,462,602$                                        50.16% 49.84%
2013 16,783,355$                                      18,072,423$                                        48.15% 51.85%
2014 25,718,519$                                      19,996,741$                                        56.26% 43.74%
2015 21,765,759$                                      20,557,560$                                        51.43% 48.57%
Total 342,237,037$                                    295,968,669$                                      53.62% 46.38%
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Table 17.   Data for Figure 14, SAWSO Annual Mission Efficiency. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
 
Year Program Service Expenses Supporting Expenses % Program Services
2003 12,378,225$                                      290,708$                                              97.71%
2004 12,426,943$                                      319,819$                                              97.49%
2005 18,233,678$                                      409,210$                                              97.81%
2006 23,853,863$                                      631,302$                                              97.42%
2007 36,562,269$                                      587,456$                                              98.42%
2008 35,135,519$                                      745,410$                                              97.92%
2009 23,518,876$                                      790,424$                                              96.75%
2010 31,575,650$                                      940,164$                                              97.11%
2011 16,033,476$                                      556,683$                                              96.64%
2012 21,797,069$                                      665,533$                                              97.04%
2013 16,968,748$                                      1,103,675$                                           93.89%
2014 18,731,087$                                      1,265,654$                                           93.67%
2015 19,466,016$                                      1,091,544$                                           94.69%
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Table 18.   Data for Figure 15, Composition of SAWSO’s Annual Program Service Expenses. Adapted from Department of 
the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
 
Year Relief & Reconstruction Expenses Other Program Service Expenses
Total Program Service 
Expenses
% Relief & Reconstruction
2003 11,099,931$                                      1,278,294$                                           12,378,225$                            89.67%
2004 11,074,894$                                      1,352,049$                                           12,426,943$                            89.12%
2005 16,097,358$                                      2,136,320$                                           18,233,678$                            88.28%
2006 20,670,578$                                      3,183,285$                                           23,853,863$                            86.66%
2007 32,552,460$                                      4,009,809$                                           36,562,269$                            89.03%
2008 30,264,043$                                      4,871,476$                                           35,135,519$                            86.14%
2009 18,944,498$                                      4,574,378$                                           23,518,876$                            80.55%
2010 28,868,645$                                      2,707,005$                                           31,575,650$                            91.43%
2011 13,927,777$                                      2,105,699$                                           16,033,476$                            86.87%
2012 19,523,581$                                      2,273,488$                                           21,797,069$                            89.57%
2013 14,863,492$                                      2,105,256$                                           16,968,748$                            87.59%
2014 17,166,379$                                      1,564,708$                                           18,731,087$                            91.65%
2015 17,687,287$                                      1,778,729$                                           19,466,016$                            90.86%
Total 252,740,923$                                    33,940,496$                                        286,681,419$                         88.16%
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Table 19.   Data for Figure 17, SAWSO Cumulative Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and Investments by IRS 
Region, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
 
Table 20.   Data for Figure 18, SAWSO Cumulative Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and Investments by U.S. 
COCOM, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
 
Region Total Expenditures
Sub-Saharan Africa 28,578,746$          
South America 9,673,702$            
North America 6,945,177$            
Central America & the Caribbean 22,009,023$          
Europe 24,973,099$          
Russia & Neighboring States 6,874,856$            
South Asia 22,735,409$          
Middle East 243,280$                
East Asia & the Pacific 8,318,902$            
COCOM Total Expenditures
USAFRICOM 28,578,746$          
USCENTCOM 243,280$                
USEUCOM 31,847,955$          
USNORTHCOM 6,945,177$            
USPACOM 31,054,311$          
USSOUTHCOM 31,682,725$          
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Table 21.   Data for Figure 19, SAWSO Annual Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and Investments by IRS Region, 















Russia & Neighboring 
States
Middle East
2003 1,367,920$            657,688$       1,290,517$    510,419$              475,763$       636,064$           424,913$        206,057$                      -$                                                   
2004 1,044,823$            539,366$       1,262,086$    848,169$              1,768,818$   1,270,635$        404,766$        20,582$                        -$                                                   
2005 2,019,036$            450,891$       1,630,133$    1,470,690$           583,606$       908,801$           489,191$        231,758$                      -$                                                   
2006 2,424,591$            463,502$       1,661,175$    588,793$              933,065$       1,535,539$        293,726$        413,893$                      -$                                                   
2007 8,110,747$            1,859,909$   1,469,276$    1,119,864$           1,647,472$   1,090,518$        4,765,161$     413,871$                      -$                                                   
2008 4,070,453$            1,941,823$   1,234,736$    2,608,815$           6,805,091$   2,905,593$        2,945,990$     692,847$                      -$                                                   
2009 2,921,803$            1,266,882$   3,573,379$    1,392,841$           6,214,007$   397,584$           653,326$        799,152$                      -$                                                   
2010 6,767,443$            1,451,518$   4,038,012$    11,603,829$         2,755,142$   326,484$           328,606$        2,063,430$                   141,236$                                           
2011 2,890,834$            1,426,730$   3,083,229$    1,201,894$           1,669,034$   648,657$           642,577$        596,518$                      73,340$                                             
2012 2,499,984$            1,114,082$   3,363,868$    2,422,322$           1,176,332$   247,731$           499,659$        749,050$                      28,704$                                             
2013 2,249,119$            531,727$       3,651,829$    720,701$              2,311,348$   264,484$           320,021$        780,816$                      -$                                                   
2014 3,732,709$            926,090$       2,122,328$    1,092,749$           1,702,859$   1,526,291$        1,040,952$     573,610$                      -$                                                   
2015 3,446,401$            1,014,850$   1,668,028$    965,872$              2,339,286$   2,002,078$        514,046$        619,433$                      -$                                                   
Totals 2003-2015 43,545,863$          13,645,058$ 30,048,595$  26,546,959$         30,381,823$ 13,760,459$      13,322,933$  8,161,017$                   243,280$                                           
Totals 2008-2015 28,578,746$          9,673,702$   22,735,409$  22,009,023$         24,973,099$ 8,318,902$        6,945,177$     6,874,856$                   243,280$                                           
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Table 22.   Data for Figure 20, SAWSO Annual Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures and Investments by U.S. 
COCOM, 2008–2015. Adapted from Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
 
Year USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
2003 1,367,920$            -$               681,820$       424,913$              1,926,581$   1,168,107$        
2004 1,044,823$            -$               1,789,400$    404,766$              2,532,721$   1,387,535$        
2005 2,019,036$            -$               815,364$       489,191$              2,538,934$   1,921,582$        
2006 2,424,591$            -$               1,346,958$    293,726$              3,196,714$   1,052,295$        
2007 8,110,747$            -$               2,061,343$    4,765,161$           2,559,793$   2,979,773$        
2008 4,070,453$            -$               7,497,938$    2,945,990$           4,140,329$   4,550,638$        
2009 2,921,803$            -$               7,013,159$    653,326$              3,970,963$   2,659,723$        
2010 6,767,443$            141,236$       4,818,572$    328,606$              4,364,496$   13,055,347$      
2011 2,890,834$            73,340$         2,265,552$    642,577$              3,731,886$   2,628,624$        
2012 2,499,984$            28,704$         1,925,382$    499,659$              3,611,599$   3,536,404$        
2013 2,249,119$            -$               3,092,164$    320,021$              3,916,313$   1,252,428$        
2014 3,732,709$            -$               2,276,469$    1,040,952$           3,648,619$   2,018,839$        
2015 3,446,401$            -$               2,958,719$    514,046$              3,670,106$   1,980,722$        
Totals 2003-2015 43,545,863$          243,280$       38,542,840$  13,322,933$         43,809,054$ 40,192,017$      
Totals 2008-2015 28,578,746$          243,280$       31,847,955$  6,945,177$           31,054,311$ 31,682,725$      
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Table 23.   Data for Figure 22, SAWSO Relief and Reconstruction Expenditures by Continent, 2008–2015. Adapted from 
Department of the Treasury, IRS (n.d.). 
Year Africa Americas Asia Europe
2008 4,070,453$            7,496,628$   4,140,329$    7,497,938$           
2009 2,921,803$            3,313,049$   3,970,963$    7,013,159$           
2010 6,767,443$            13,383,953$ 4,505,732$    4,818,572$           
2011 2,890,834$            3,271,201$   3,805,226$    2,265,552$           
2012 2,499,984$            4,036,063$   3,640,303$    1,925,382$           
2013 2,249,119$            1,572,449$   3,916,313$    3,092,164$           
2014 3,732,709$            3,059,791$   3,648,619$    2,276,469$           
2015 3,446,401$            2,494,768$   3,670,106$    2,958,719$           
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